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1. SUMMARY: Petr challeng e s his fel~ r conviction 
on the qround that his confe ssion wa s improperly admitt e d since it 
was t a ke n after he ha d invoke d his 6th amendme nt rig ht to couns e l. ----He also claims (1) tha t he was denied the b e nefit o f the pre s umption 
of innoc e nce be cause he wa s tri e d in prison g a rb, (2) th a t he wa s 
deni ed the right to compulsor y p r o ce ss when a n a libi witnes s was 
exclude d be cause of failure to disclo s e the witness to the 
prose ctuion, (3) tha t the p r o secutor imprope rly comment e d on his 
failur e to take the sta nd, and (4) that he wa s d e ni e d a speedy trial. 
CS/l._ ,- M,ra.Jo.. clarMr ;/l tl-tod.e. Mewl 
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2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: In October, 1974, the "La 
✓ 
Conga" bar in Tucson was robbed at gunpoint. During the robbery the 
proprietor suffered a fatal heart attack. No leads were obtained 
until January, 1976, when a participant apprehended on other charges 
led the police to petr and others, who were immediately arrested. 
Petr ~epresented himself at his jury trial, urging alibi as his main 
defense. The trial ended in a hung jury, and petr was immediately 
retried. He was convicted of felony murder, burglary and robbery and 
✓ 
sentenced to death. He was resentenced to life imprisonment in the 
wake of Lockett and Bell. 
A. The confession. After petr's arrest, he was taken to the 
police station, read his Miranda rights and interrogated for 2 1/2 
hours by detective Bunting. He gave a taped alibi statement and 
✓ 
expressed an interest in a deal but said that he would wait until he 
had spoken to an attorney. The courts below held that this was 
sufficient to invoke his 6th amendment right to consult counsel 
before making any statements. Petr was then taken to the jail, where 
he was held in solitarj confinement overnight. The next morning a 
guard told petr that detectives were there to see him. Petr said he 
did not wish to speak to anyone. The guard ~old him he had to, and 
took him to an interrogation room where detectives Marmion and Milne 
questioned him despite knowledge that an attorney would not be 
appointed until the afternoon. These two detectives did not know 
that petr had requested an attorney, although Bunting had instructed 
Milne to go to the jail to interview petr. 
Petr was again read his Miranda rights. He responded that 
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statement of his coconspirator. When asked at the suppression 
v 
hearing why he did not again request an attorney, he said "I didn't 
think you had to keep asking for an attorney over and over and over." 
, After hearing a part of the tape, petr said that he would make a 
statement but that he didn't want it tape recorded because he did not 
want it used against him. The detectives· explained to him that even 
unrecorded, oral statements could be used against him. Petr replied 
"I'll tell you anything you want to know, but I don't want it on 
tape." He then gave inculpatory statements. Detective Marmion left 
the room thereafter and tape recorded his recollection of the 
interview. At trial, Marmion testified as to the statements. 
~ e trial court first suppressed the confession but changed 
its mind 3 days later, concluding on the basis of an Arizona opinion 
that this Court's opinion in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) 
permitted the conduct described. The Arizona Supreme Court held that 
petr had invoked his right to counsel, but that Miranda did not 
create a per se rule against waiver of the right to an attorney after 
the right is invoked. United States v~ Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 
482 (CA9), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978); see Mosley, supra, at 
102 (blanket prohibition "would deprive suspects of an opportunity to 
make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests"). The 
Court then looked at the totality of the circumstances and conclude d 
that it could not overturn the trial court's conclusion that the 
state had shown by a prepond e rance of the evidence that the 
confession was freely and voluntarily made. The refusal to put the 
statements on tape was not e nough to show any misunderstanding since 
the detectives had thoroughly explained the adrnisaibility of oral 
- - 4 • 
• statements and petr may have refused taping for other reasons, i.e., 
because of the impression he received from his coconspirator's taped 
statement. · Justice Gordon dissented on the voluntariness issue. He 
said petr had been told he had to speak to the detectives. The 
police did not "scrupulously honor" his right to cut off questioning, 
and his statement could not have been voluntary. 
C, 
B. Prison garb. Petr objected at the beginning of the 
second trial that he was "in front of the jury in slippers and 
jailhouse clothes" which "they know, if they have been in Arizona a 
long time" and that this would prejudice him. The judge suggested 
that perhaps clothing could be obtained from the Salvation Army. The 
state made no comment and voiced no disagreement with petr's 
description of his clothing. On appeal, petr urged that he was 
denied the due process presumption of innocence by being forced to 
trial in identifiable prison garb, as this Court held in Estelle v . 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). The state replied that he should have 
continued to object to show that he remained in prison garb 
throughout the trial. The Arizona Supreme Court held that there was 
no indication in the record that Edwards' prison clothes were 
identifiable as such, and that petr made no offer of proof as to the 
identifiable nature of his clothes. 
C. Prec lusion of defense witness. Petr attempted to call a 
wtiness to testify that petr was intoxicated at 6:00 pm the night 
before the robbery. The state objected because petr had not 
disclosed the witness as required by the Arizona criminal discovery 
- rules, even though he knew of both the witness and the intoxication ~, 
} 
defense long before trial. Rule 15.2 of the Arizona Rules of 
- - s. 
=- Criminal Procedure requires a defendant to supply written notice of 
C, 
~ 
defenses and witnesses within 20 days after arraignment. Sanctions 
for · nondisclosure include ordering disclosure, granting a 
continuance, contempt, preclusion of testimony": and mistrial. The 
trial court ordered that the witness be made available for an 
interview by the prosecutor, which was conducted at the lunch break. 
Three days later, the court heard argument on the objection, at which 
the state also argued that intoxication at 6:00 pm was not relevant 
to participation in a robbery at 1:00 am, 7 hours later. The trial 
court imposed the sanction of preclusion without explicitly 
considering other alternatives. 
The Arizona Supreme Court held that under Arizona law such 
rulings could be overturned only if the prejudice was such that the 
defendant was denied a fair trial. The testimony, while relevant, 
"was not sorositive that its absence denied [petr] a fair trial." 
D. Comment on failure to testify. The prosecutor began his 
. ✓ .. 
closing argument by wr1t1ng on a chalk board "Defendant confessed". 
He then analyzed the inferences to be drawn from the confession. At 
the beginning of petr's closing argument (representing himself), petr 
wrote on the chalk board "Defendant did not confess." He also told 
the jury during argument tha t he did not confess. 
the prosecutor said: 
In his rebuttal, 
The evidence, you will recall, is what the witnesses 
say from the witness stand h ere under oath. And there 
is an important thing about witnesses and what they 
testify to. They are subject to cross-examination .• . . . 
What evidence is there that he did not confess? Did 
any witness come in here and say ... that there was 
no confession ... ? That inciden t never occurred. 
No ... nobody testified to that. No witnesses were 
call e d that t ~stified about that confession not being 







The most conclusive statement is his own statement. He 
never said he didn't confess other than writing it on 
the easel. 
He told you he wasn't involved in the crime, he wasn't 
guilty. Here he told you that like I'm telling you, 
like I'm talking to you, not under oath. 
The Arizona Supreme Court held that petr's argument was 
improper because it was wholly unsupported by the evidence. He had 
been warned by the judge before argument not to make statements 
unsupported by evidence. He thus'1nvited the prosecutor's 
statements, which would otherwise have been error. 
6. 
E. Speedy trial. The original indictment in this case was 
dismissed because of grand jury irregularities. The state spent 4 
months litigating that dismissal instead of reindicting petr, which 
could probably have been done in a matter of days. After the 
reindictment, petr filed motions to dismiss on speedy .trial grounds, 
supported by an affidavit of his investigator stating that 3 alibi 
witnesses had been lost due to the delay. The motions were denied. 
One alibi witness was finally located but gave only hazy testimony. 
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this claim after a 
thorough Barker v. Wingo analysis. It concluded that the delay was 
excessive but not "prejudicial per se." Petr properly asserted his 
rights, but only 4 months of the delay were caused by the state, 
which diligently pursued its appeal and was not required to reindict 
under federal law. United State s v. Osuna -Sanchez 446 F.2d 566 (CA9 
1971). Finally, petr was not as prejudiced as he claimed. He made 
no offer of proof as to what the alleg e d witnesses would have said. 
Nor did he show that the y would have b e en available in the absence of 
the 4 month delay. He called one a libi witne ss in whose sole 
presence he claimed he was during the robbe ry, and was granted 




3. CONTENTIONS AND DISCUSSION: Petr repeats his five 
claims in this Court. On the Miranda claim, he argues that the Court 
should resolve the question whether Miranda imposes an absolute ban 
on police questioning after a request for an attorney, or whether 
principles of waiver apply. This is one of the issues raised in 
V 
Rhode Island v. Innis, No. 78-1076, and the case should thus be held 
for Innis. If the issue is not reached in that case, the Court may 
wish to grant this one in order to resolve it. Although the Circuits 
are not split, there has been some confusion. CA9 holds that waiver 
is permissible, Rodriguez-Gastelum, supra. Until 1977, CA5 held that 
it is not, and rehearing en bane has been granted in the case 
overruling that prior authority. Nash v. Estelle 560 F.2d 652 
(1977), overruling United States v . Priest 409 F.2d 491 ( 1969). This 
" case may not be an ideal vehicle for the decision, however, s i nce the 
confession was arguably inadmissible because of involuntariness 
regardless of the result on the Miranda question. The dissenting 
Justice urged that ground below, although the majority's concl usion 
was justifiable. 
Second , with r e spe c t to pr ison gar b, petr s ays the result 
confl i cts with the ru l e of Es t e ll e v. Wi l li ams . In f a ct , it me r ely 
applies the r u le . Although the cour t be low pro bably took a n overl y 
stri ngen t v i e w of the requ i remen t of a n ob jec t ion , e s pecially where 
petr represented himse l f , I doub t that th i s claim i s c ertworthy. 
Third , pe tr says the Court should rule on t he witness 
prec l usion issue because i t s quar e ly prese nts impor t ant questions 
e regarding the balanc e between the defendan t ' s right to compulsory 
pro cess a nd the state ' s intere st in enforcing its d iscovery rules. 
• - - 8. 
~- However, the Court has held that such discovery rules can be 
~ 
constitutional, Williams v. Florida 399 U.S. 28 (1970), as long as 
they are reciprocal, Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). 
1 Although the sanction was overly harsh in this case, the qqestionable 
value of the evidence to petr's case cuts against review, and I would 
deny on this claim as well. 
Fourth, petr argues that the holding below permitting the 
quoted prosecutorial comments conflicts with Faretta v. California 
422 U.S. 806 (1975), because it penalizes petr for arguing his case 
th€ way any lawyer could. Petr claims that there was in fact 
evidence supporting the inference that he had not confessed. He 
argued, for example, that the detectives said there was only an oral 
confession, not a stronger written one, and that he had previously 
(!!t given an alibi statement. I do not believe that the cited evidence 
supports his argument. It appears that he was simply attempting to 
testify without subjecting himself to cross-examination. The 
prosecutor was entitled to point that out. Petr is probably correct 
that there was more emphasis on the failure to testify than was 
proper even under these circumstances. But I doubt that this 
question of d egree is worthy of this Court's attention at this time. 
• 
Fifth, petr reasserts his speedy trial cl a im but arg ues 
nothing new. The disposition below appe a rs to have bee n co r r e ct. 
4. CONCLUSION: I would ~ CFR and hold for Innis on the 
Mir a nda qu e stion, with the poss ibility of a grant if th a t q ue stion is 
not resolved in Innis. Althoug h t he prose cu t o ri al comme n t c laim has 
some subst a nce, I would otherwise d e ny. 
The r e is~ response. 
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C H A M B E RS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
I 
~I! t t ,~b ! $ 
'Jf rur frngLm. t9. <q. 20 gr~~ 
January 8, 1980 ~ 
Re: No. 79-5269 - Edwards v. Arizona 
Dear Byron, 
Like Harry, I am not so sure that the Sixth Amendment 
claim is not properly before us. The fact that Edwards did 
mention the Sixth Amendment in his supporting memorandum 
trial, albeit ambiguously, might be enough to give us a fi 
judgment here. Sin·ce you base the opinion on the Fifth Am 
claim in any event, I wonder wh ether you need to decide th 
judgm~nt issue on the Sixth Amendment claim. Can't you sim 
state that we need not address that claim in light of our 





1 As for the merits of Edwards' Fifth Amendment claim , like 
Harry and John, I believe that Miranda contemplated a per se rule 
once the accused, in custodial detention, asks for counsel, all 
interrogation must cease until he obtains a lawyer. Of course, 
the accused, on his own initiative and without instigation of 
any sort from the police, may waive his request for counsel 
sua sponte and talk to the police, but that is not this case. 
Justice White 
cc. The Conference 
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MEMORAND TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Case held for 78-1076, Rhode Island v. Innis 
~ =>,--~ 
In Edwards v. Arizon , o. 79-5269, ~ case held for 
Rhode Innis v. Innis, the p · s review of sev-
eral questions, one of which is we er the police vio-
lated Miranda by interrogating the petitioner outside the 
presence of counsel after the petitioner had requested the 
assistance of counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court held 
that Miranda does not create a~ se rule that once a 
defendant invokes his right to counsel he may not be ques-
tioned again by the police until counsel is present. On 
the facts of this case, the Arizona Supreme Court con-
cluded that the trial court had correctly found that peti-
tioner had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel under Miranda before further interrogation took 
place. 
The petitioner now argues that the Arizona Supreme 
Court erred in holding that Miranda does not create a~ 
se rule against police interrogation after a defendant has 
invoked his right to counsel. The petitioner asserts that 
the courts of appeals are in conflict on this question. 
Compare United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 
(CA9 1978) (en bane) (no per se rule against further inter-
rogation after the Miranda right to counsel has been 
asserted), with Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (CA5 1979) 
(en bane) (reaffirming the holding of a CA5 panel in 
United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491, that a suspect may 
not waive his Miranda right to counsel "when, prior to any 
questioning, the suspect makes an unequivocal request for 
an attorney's presence"). 
?ki!--fk.u~o/~Tc,nu/~"71/oM~ ~ 1 ~ ~ , /...d-- th /~ _,,,-t-MP c,iq;-ht4f to<Et d f ltlt . 
~ f~J /fnc__ 






Since the Court concluded in Innis that the respond-
ent had not been interrogated by the police after he had 
requeste c sel, it was unnecessary to reach any ques-
tion of waiver The decision in Innis thus does not con-
trol th outco e of Edwards. Accordingly, it is my view 
that the da question presented in Edwards, along with 
the remaining questions presented, must be considered 
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September 17, 1980 
RE: No. 79-5269, Edwards v. Arizona 
counsel, 
&-~ ~ ~ ~J r/L-U-<. I 
;:2.- ~· vf p-vr. n.......,,, :J ~, ,__,,_,~~ 
Questions Presented ?~ ~L-,_f-~,,,;~f./ 
~ ~  
May a criminal defendant, after invoking his right to 
~~-
waive that right without the advice of an attorney? If -----so, was there a knowing and intelligent waiver in this case? 
Background 
The facts in this case are straightforward and will - __.. . '-.... __ _ not be repeated herein except where necessary for emphasis. 
Petr in this case has two primary lines of argument supporting 
his view that his right to counsel, once invoked, cannot be 
waived without the advice of counsel. Petr's first argument is 
based on his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination as explicated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 







If the individual states that he wants an 
attorney, the interrogation must cease until 
an attorney is present. 
2. 
Id. at 474. This, according to petr, establishes an absolute 
ban on renewed questioning until the attorney is present. 
Petr's second argument is based on his sixth amendment 
right to counsel developed in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 
201 (1964), Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), and similar 
cases. The "Massiah right to counsel" theory is based on the -----
principle that the police must deal with the attorney rather 
than with the client after an attorney-client relationship 
exists. Interrogation, after an attorney is requested, 
unconstitutionally interferes with that relationship. 
You already have taken a position with respect to 
waiver of the Massiah right. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 
387, 409 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring), you recognized that a 
defendant could waive his sixth amendment right to counsel even ---------- ~ 
after first invoking it. Id. at 410, 412-13. As I shall 
explain below, if it is possible to waive the sixth amendment 
right, I believe it follows a fortiori that it also is possible 
to waive the fifth amendment right. Thus, 
position on the fifth amendment waiver issue 
controlled by the position you took in Brewer. 
in my view, your 




If the right to counsel can be waived once invoked, ~ 
this case reduces itself to a factual inquiry into whether petr~ 









IS THERE A PER SE RULE AGAINST WAIVER? 
A. The "Massiah Right to 9ounsel" Line of Argument 
1. Petr's Arguments 
3. 
An accused is entitled to counsel to assist him after 
the commencement of the prosecution. Massiah v. United States, 
sµpra; Brewer v. Williams, supra; United States v. Henry, No. 
79-121 (June 16, 1980). In Arizona, the filing of a complaint 
before a magistrate is one of two methods by which a felony 
prosecution is brought. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 2.2. In this case, 
the complaint had been filed before petr was arrested and 
incarcerated overnight. Petr was entitled to a preliminary 
hearing at which the counsel he requested would have been 
appointed. But the interrogation by police occurred before the 
preliminary hearing. Interrogation should not have occurred 
until the appointment of counsel. 
Petr's request to see counsel reflects petr' s 
recognition of his inability to conduct his defense alone. 
Faced with the intimidating circumstances of custody, petr 
rationally -- indeed, intelligently -- chose to put his defense, 
including his response to pretrial investigatory matters, in the 
hands of an experienced attorney. In Michigan v. Mosley, Mr. 
Justice White observed that the invocation of counsel is an 
expression of "his own view that he is not competent to deal 
with the authorities without legal advice." 423 U.S. 96, 110 







The lawyer's assistance is useful not only in deciding 
what to tell pol ice, but also ~ any information should be 
revealed. In this case, petr wanted to "make a deal," but 
desired a lawyer's help in its negotiation. Plea bargaining is 
"an essential component of the administration of justice" which 
"presupposes fairness in securing agreements between an accused 
and a prosecutor." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971 ). 
A lawyer's negotiating assistance can be at least as useful in 
plea bargaining as it can be in organizing a defense for trial. 
This case was a capital case, and therefore one in which petr 
might well elect to plea bargain. 
That the sixth amendment right to counsel attached, 
and that petr said that he wished to avail himself of that 
right, is highly relevant to the question of waiver under the 
sixth amendment. When a suspect elects to have counsel, he 
concedes his own 
'----- '-----
inad equacy in dealing alone with -the 
prosecution's Having expressed that recognition, "a 
later decision at the authorities' insistance to make a 
statement without counsel's presence may properly be viewed with 
skepticism." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 110 n.2 (White, 
J. , concurring). In other words, once the suspect puts his 
defense in the hands of an attorney, the sixth amendment 
requires that the prosecution respect the right to counsel by 
dealing with the suspect only through counsel. The suspect, 
having placed his defense in counsel's hands, constitutionally 







2. Resp' s Argume,nts 
The State does not set forth much analysis in 
opposition. The State does, however, quote substantial 
authority suggesting that a suspect can waive the right to 
counsel once invoked. In Brewer v. Williams, Mr. Justice 
Stewart's majority opinion stated: 
The District Court and Court of Appeals were 
• correct in their understanding of the 
p :i:_oper standa~d to be applied in determining 
the q ues tion of waiver as a matter of 
f e ct era l const:1 c ut ~ law -- that it was 
incumbent upon the State to prove "an 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of 
a known right or privilege." Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464. That standard has 
been reiterated in many cases. 
* * * * 
The Court of Appeals did not hold, 
nor do we, that under the circumstances of 
this case Williams could not, without notice 
to counsel, have waived his rights under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. It only 




430 U.S. at 404-06. See also United States v. ~ nry, 100 S. Ct. 
at 2187 ("affirmative interrogation, absent waiver," is 
condemned by Massiah) (emphasis added). 
In a concurring opinion, you stated it even more --explicitly: 
7. 
[O]nce the right to counsel attached (it is 
conceded that it had in this case), the 
State could not properly interrogate 
Williams in the absence of counsel unless he 
voluntarily and knowingly waived that right 
* * * * 
dissenting opinion 
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suspect is legally incompetent to change his 
mind and tell the truth until an attorney is 
present." Post, at 419. I find no 
justificationfor this view. On the 
contrary, the opinion of the Court is 
explicitly clear that the right to 
assistance of counsel may be waived, after 
it has attached, without notice to or 
consultation with counsel. 
6. 
1..£· at 410, 413 (Powell, J., concurring). 
B. The "Miranda Privi!ege ,Against 
Self-Incrimination" Line of Argument 
1. Petr's Arguments 
Petr retraces the history of the Court's struggle to 
deal with the problem of involuntary confessions. Such 
confessions are untrustworthy because the conditions under which 
they are obtained may compel an innocent person to incriminate 
himself. Moreoever, to permit their use as evidence is to 
sanction the illegal methods by which the statements were 
obtained. 
The presence of counsel is an important safeguard in 
ensuring that confessions are voluntary. An attorney can help 
mitigate the coercive influences inherent in custodial 
interrogation. Petr says that Miranda itself established a rule 
requiring that interrogation cease when counsel is invoked. 
Miranda says: 
Once warnings have been given, the 
subsequent procedure is clear. If the 
individual indicates in any manner, at any 
time prior to, or during questioning, that 
he wishes to remain silent, the 
interrogation must cease. At this point he 
has shown that he intends to exercise his 
Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement 






cannot be other than the product of 
compulsion, subtle or otherwise. • • • If 
the individual states that he wants an 
attorney, the interrogation must cease until 
an attorney is present. At that time, the 
individual must have an opportunity to 
confer with the attorney and to have him 
present during any subsequent questioning. 
If the individual cannot obtain an attorney 
and he indicates that he wants one before 
speaking to police, they must respect his 
decision to remain silent. 
This per se approach, according to petr, 
7. 
was 
reiterated in Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). In that 
case the defendant, a juvenile, had asked to see his probation 
officer. Po 1 ice refused. The Supreme Court held that this did 
not amount to a Miranda violation, but it did so because a 
probation officer is not the same thing as an attorney: 
The per se aspect of Miranda was thus based 
on the unique role the lawyer plays in the 
adversarial system of criminal justice in 
this country. • • . For this reason, the 
Court fashioned in Miranda the rig id rule 
that an accused's request for an attorney is 
per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment 
rights, requiring that all interrogation 
cease. 
~ s t11 . 
~~ --
Petr points out that lower courts have split on how to 
deal with renewed interrogation by the police. Some have 
applied an absolute bar. Some have permitted only defendant-
initiated questioning. Some permit a knowing and intelligent 
waiver. Petr's preferred position is the first, but he is 
willing to settle for the second. The third possibility, the 
"knowing and intelligent waiver" rule, is defective for several 









"Any other rule will handcuff ~he , police." Not so, 
The delay in procuring an attorney is only a matter 
In this case, police were not investigating an 
unsolved crime, but were seeking to obtain an incriminating 
statement for use at trial. Thus, no investigatory interest 
would have been impaired. In any event, constitutional 
protections do not disappear simply because it would be more 
convenient to the police if they did not exist. The Miranda 
Court itself properly rejected the "hardship" argument. 
"We should not imprison a person in bis privileges." 
The Arizona Supreme Court had concluded that any other rule 
would prevent a person from changing his mind. Petr says this 
is fallacious: unless a per se rule is employed, the police 
will have an incentive to induce a suspect to change his mind 
after the suspect freely chooses to seek a lawyer. Any change 
of mind, after the exercise of that free choice, is inherently 
untrustworthy. 
Petr says additional factors support a per se ban on 
interrogation. If the request for counsel is not honored, a 
suspect may feel compelled to g.ive up the fight. Petr here 
spoke to police because "every time I asked for [a lawyer] I 
never got one." A 
interrogation will not 
criminal; it might, 




that permits police to renew 
the police "break" the hardened 
other hand, induce an innocent 






There is no need, according to resp, absolutely to 
prohibit renewed questioning after a suspect has asked for a 
lawyer. M~chigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), considered 
whether questioning may be renewed after a suspect has invoked 
his right to remain silent. The Court held that Miranda did not 
create a "per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any 
further questioning by an police officer on any subject," id. at 
102-03, because "literal interpretations [of Miranda] would lead 
to absurd and unintended results," id. at 1 02. The same should 
be true with respect to renewed interrogation after the right to 
counsel is invoked. If, after having first invoked the right to 
counsel, a suspect chooses knowingly and voluntarily to waive 
that right, it would "imprison him in his privilege" not to 
permit him to change his mind. 
The facts of the instant case demonstrate the 
circumstances under which a suspect who has asked for an 
attorney rationally might change his mind. On the morning of 
the renewed interrogation, petr knew that pol ice had a taped 
statement from an alleged coconspirator. Petr understandably 
wanted to hear this statement. This desire might change his 
assessment of the advantages of waiting for a lawyer. If he 
were innocent, he might be able to explain the coconspirator's 
statement and immediately be released from jail. See ~ichigan 
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 109 n.1 (White, J., concurring). 
To reject the per se rule is not, of -- course, to 






"waives" his right to an attorney. But any allegation of 
harassment or overbearing can be addressed in the inquiry into 
whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent. 
Resp points out that the majority of courts have 
rejected a per se rule and permit renewed questioning upon a 
showing that counsel was knowingly and voluntarily waived. 
Miranda its elf envisions circumstances in which the right to 
counsel could be waived; it would be make little sense to 
permit someone to waive his right to counsel at the outset, but 
deny the suspect the opportunity to change his mind once having 
asked for a lawyer. 
✓ 
Rhode Island v. Innis, No. 78-1076 (May 1 2, 1 980), 
tends to support the view that the right to an attorney, once 
invoked, can be waived under Miranda. The Court's opinion 
noted, "Since we conclude that the respondent was not 
"interrogated" for Miranda purposes, we do not reach the 
question whether the respondent waived his right under Miranda 
to be free from interrogation until counsel was present." 100 
s. Ct. at 1688 n.2. If there were any doubt that petr could not 
waive counsel after having invoked it, the footnote would not 
have stated that the opinion did not reach the question of 
waiver in fact; the inquiry would have been whether petr could 
have waived his right to counsel at all. 
C. The "Due Process" Line of Argument 
I introduced this memo by stating that petr has two 








argues that, after he requested counsel, due" pro9ess required 
police not to ask him further questions. See United States v. 
~pringer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1354-55 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (FBI agents' attempts to obtain statements from one 
already represented by counsel, without notifying counsel, is 
"unethical and unfair" in the civil suit context, and violative 
of due process in the criminal context), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
873 (1972). This argument is not persuasive. Supreme Court 
interrogation cases appear to be analyzed either as "Miranda" 
cases or as "Massiah" cases. It is significant that three 
dissenters in Massiah saw no merit in the due process theory. 
Mr. Justice White wrote for himself and Justices Clark and 
Harlan, and commented: 
I am unable to see how this case 
presents an unconstitutional interference 
with Massiah's right to counsel ••.. 
* * * * 
This case cannot be analogized to the 
American Bar Association's rule forbidding 
an attorney to talk to the opposing party 
litigant outside the presence of his 
counsel. Aside from the fact that the 
Association's canons are not of 
constitutional dimensions, the specific 
canon argued is inapposite because it deals 
with the conduct of lawyers and not with the 
conduct of investigators. 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 209, 210-11 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
p. Analysis & Criticism 
Resp's brief is little 
5/zvl<~ ~~ 
more than a colla?e of case 
quotations without analysis. I'll try to supply some. It seems 





- ~ - - A-c~ ~~ ~~u-~~ 
~ , ~k ~ 
theoretical bases. The Massiah strand envisions counsel as an 
advocate who will conduct the defense of the accused. Choosing 
to have counsel is, in effect, a recognition by a criminal 
defendant that he is incapable of managing his defense alone. 
And, indeed, once a suspect has requested assistance in the 
preparation and conduct of his defense, he relinquishes to the 
attorney many of the tactical decisions that will arise. Henry 
v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965); see Faretta v. 
Califo~nia, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975). At that time, the 
prosecutor -- if he wishes to communicate with the defense in 
any way -- must deal with the representative that the accused 
has selected. In sum: 
The rule of Massiah serves the salutary 
purpose of preventing police interference 
with the relationship between a suspect and 
his counsel once formal proceedings have 
been initiated. 
~ ~ z,j. 
~i~ 
United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct at 2190 
concurring). 
(Powell, J., 
The Miranda line of argument is different. Miranda, -at bottom, seeks to prevent the introduction of coerced 
confrssions because of their presumed unreliability. The 
:lft13" strand envisions counsel's presence as a bulwark against 
which the accused can lean when the prosecution applies the 
"third degree" 
technique. 
or some some subtle, but equally effective 
Because the logical underpinnings of the two strands 





/r 1 3. 
the waiver inquiry also must differ. Consider first the Miranda 
strand. I think any danger of introducing into evidence a 
coerced, and hence possibly unreliable confession, is eliminated 
by the two-phase voluntariness inquiry that must be conducted 
beforehand. First, a court must decide whether petr knowingly 
and intelligently waived counsel. Even if he did waive counsel, 
a second inquiry must be conducted before the confession can be 
introduced: whether the resultin.9. confession also was 
voluntary. Thus, the State must make two showings to introduce 
the confession, the failure of either one of which causes the 
confession to be excluded. Petr's argument would deny an 
accused the right knowingly and intelligently to waive the first 
component of the dual inquiry. The deficiency of petr's 
argument is that it overlooks the second, and more important 
component 
confession. 
the voluntariness vel non of the subsequent 
In other words, petr provides no reason why a 
confession obtained from someone who first invoked counsel, then 
changed his mind, should be treated any differently from a 
confession from someone who waived counsel at the outset. There 
is no reason why the latter is any more likely to be reliable 
than the former. Indeed, I should think (as an empirical 
matter) that the enhanced protection should run the other way. 
Someone who requests counsel thereby demonstrates to some extent 
his resiliency to the persuasive forces of the police. That 
person probably is much less in need of protection than someone 







However, I view the sixth amendment/Massiah strand of 
argument as logically somewhat stronger • If petr' s invocation 
.._ -----
of the right to counsel is considered an admission that he is 
incapable alone of making the decisions pertinent to his 
defense, arguably he also is incapable of intelligently deciding 
whether or not to talk to police before his attorney can arrive. 
V chief Judge Breitel has made the argument more persuasively than 
I can: 
[T] he presence of counsel is a more 
effective safeguard against an involuntary 
waiver of counsel than a mere written or 
oral warning in the absence of counsel ••• 
• The rule that once a lawyer has entered 
the proceedings in connection with the 
charges under investigation, a person in 
custody may validly waive the assistance of 
counsel only in the presence of a lawyer 
breathes life into the requirement that a 
waiver of a constitutional right must be 
competent, intelligent and voluntary. 
Indeed, it may be said that a right too 
easily waived is no right at all .•.• 
* * * * 
..• The right to the continued advice 
of a lawyer, already retained or assigned, 
is his real protection against an abuse of 
power by the organized State. It is more 
important than the preinterrogation warnings 
given to defendants in custody. These 
warnings often provide only a feeble 
opportunity to obtain a lawyer, because the 
suspect or accused is required to determine 
Fi' d d ' d by anyone who has his 
People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 484, 485 (1976 ); accord, 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 110 n.2 (White, J., concurring). 
Thus, if police need to communicate with the nascent 
defense "team," the Massiah strand of argument suggests that 







designed to vindicate the sixth amendment right to counsel's 
advice. This is a somewhat broader range of protections than 
Miranda's objective, which is to exclude coerced and unreliable 
confessions. The Massiah line of argument for that reason 
provides at least as strong, and perhaps a stronger 
justification, for not permitting a waiver of counsel. But see 
Kamisar, Police Interrogations and Confessions 202 ( "It may be 
my shortcoming, but I fail to see why an alleged waiver of a 
specifically and repeatedly asserted 'Miranda right to counsel' 
should not be judged by the same strict Johnson v. Zerbst 
standards applicable to a 'Massiah right to counsel.' Indeed, 
if one must choose, a right to counsel designed to meet a 
specific need -- 'dispel[ling] the compelling atmosphere of the 
interrogation' -- would seem more deserving of protection than 
the more abstract Massiah right, which applies whether or not 
'the privilege against [compelled] self-incrimination is 
jeopardized.'") 
You have stated clearly -- and I think correctly --
l that being invoked. the right to counsel under Massiah can be waived after Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 409-10, 412-13 
(Rowell, J., concurring). The reasons for this rule are similar 
to those discussed earlier in connection with waiver of the 
Miranda right to counsel. It would be paternalism at best, and 
nonsense at worst, to 
~
mind. The defendant -
prevent 
has e 
a defendant from changing his 
opportun at the outset to 









having first requested counsel, the defendant should reconsider. 
The facts of this case present an example in which a defendant 
rationally might want to change his mind. Petr, knowing that 
the police had a taped statement from an alleged coconspirator, 
might want immediately to explain away its contents and be 
released from jail. Mr. Justice White observed: 
Although a recently arrested individual may 
have indicated an initial desire not to 
answer questions, he would nonetheless want 
to know immediately -- if it were true --
that his ability to explain a particular 
incriminating fact or to supply an alibi for 
a particular time period would result in his 
immediate release. Similarly, he might wish 
to know -- if it were true -- that (1) the 
case against him was unusually strong and 
that (2) his immediate cooperation with the 
authorities in the apprehension and 
conviction of others or in the recovery of 
property would redound to his benefit in the 
form of a reduced charge. 
~ chigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 109 n.1 (White, J., concurring). 
For these reasons, if an accused, having been initially inclined 
to wait for an attorney, should knowingly and intelligently 
change his mind and decide to deal with the police himself, 
nothing in the sixth amendment should impede him. 
If the Massiah line of cases permits waiver of counsel 
after first requesting counsel, I think it follows a fortiori 
that waiver is permitted with respect to the Miranda line. I 
think, therefore, that your vote on the availability of waiver 






II. WAS THERE WAIVER IN THIS CASE? 
A. Petr's Ar~uments 
Petr says no waiver occurred in this case. He had 
spent the night in solitary confinement. He did not revoke his ,......__ ___ __,,--.., _____ .......... _____ _ 
request for counsel made the evefning before. He told the 
officer that he did not want to speak with them; they dragged 
him out of his cell. He said he did not want the statement 
taped because he was afraid it would be used against him in 
court. Although the officers told petr that taping was 
unnecessary because they could testify about whatever he said, 
petr insisted that no tape recorder be used. Petr obviously was 
confused about the legal significance of the tape. He did not 
understand 
waived them. 
his rights; it is therefore impossible that he 
It is true that North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 
369 (1979), established that waiver need not be explicit and 
could be implied from the circumstances of the case. But waiver 
cannot be inferred from the facts here. And at least one court 
has suggested that there must be a greater showing of waiver of 
counsel where the suspect has first invoked counsel. State v. 
Nash, 407 A.2d 365, 368 (N.H. 1979). ----- This is weaker case for 
waiver even than Brewer v. Williams, because at least in that 
case the defendant had had an opportunity to be warned by an 
attorney not to speak with police during the ride to Des Moines. 
Here, petr had not had the benefit of any conversation at all 
with an attorney. 






Petr had received ample, and repeated, notification of 
his right to counsel. On the day of his arrest, petr received 
three sets of Miranda warnings. Each time, petr told police he 
~
understood his rights. Petr also was warned of his rights the 
following morning. Petr did not say at t ha t time tha t he did 
not want to talk to them, and he did not ask for an attorney. 
Petr later testified that he didn't repeat his request because 
"I didn't think you had to keep asking for an attorney over and 
over and over." This is a post hoc rationalization. At trial, 
the prosecution presented psychiatric testimony that established 
that petr was intelligent enough to understand the warnings he 
had received. 
The police in this case did not badger petr into -----relinquishing his rights. After petr asked for an attorney the 
prior evening, police stopped the questioning. They resumed it 
only the next morning. 
Petr makes much of the fact that he specifically asked 
that the statement not be recorded. But this does not 
demonstrate that petr thought an unrecorded statement would be 
inadmissible. Police made clear that they could testify about 
anything petr told them. Petr, who by his own admission had 
"been around," may have been attempting to have it both ways: 
on the one hand to try to obtain whatever advantage he could 
from making an immediate statement, but on the other to keep his 
statement off tape so that he could contest it later on. 






-- .,. ,..- ,' 
It would have been nice if the state trial court had 
made a finding that petr knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
right to counsel on the morning of the second interrogation. 
Contrary to resp' s indications in the brief, it did not. The 
trial court did find that the statement was voluntary, but that 
does not mean that the waiver of counsel was knowing and 
voluntary. Thus, it would be impossible for this Court to find 
waiver of counsel by deferring to the factfinding of the state 
trial court. It is true that the state supreme court found a 
knowing waiver of counsel, but that is not nearly as useful as a 
finding by the trial judge. 
There really are two particularly troubling facts. 6 petr was unwillingly dragged out of his cell on the 
morning of the renewed interrogation. ecorrtj , petr emphasized 
that he did not want the statement recorded. Petr says that 
these facts combine to establish that he had not waived the 
right to counsel that he had invoked the prior evening. It is 
important to recognize, I think, that these troubling facts 
really are directed at different issues. That petr was dragged 
out of his cell is properly relevant to waiver of counsel. But 
petr's insistance that his statement not be recorded, while 
highly relevant to the voluntariness vel non of the statement, 
does not support petr's contention that he had not waived 
counsel. Indeed, it may cut the other way ~ tr's decision to 
negotiate about the manner in which his statement was to be 








supporting waiver of counsel. Such negotiations are precisely 
the thing that counsel could have done for petr. That petr 
elected to undertake them himself tends to demonstrate that he 
tacitly waived whatever right to counsel that he earlier had 
invoked. 
I do think the question of waiver is close~~ • Sub 
silentio waiver of a right earlier invoked ought not easily be 
inferred. The preceding paragraph attempted to demonstrate that 
waiver of counsel is analytically distinct from the inquiry into 
the voluntariness of the ensuing statement. Seen in this light, 
the taping controversy does not support petr' s argument on the 
waiver of counsel issue. 
For these reasons, I am inclined to find waiver of 
counsel. 
Summary . .. / ~ 
and 
There are analytical dist7-:~~: between the Miranda 
Massiah rights to counsel. There are, accordingly, 
differences in the analysis pertaining to waiver of those 
rights. The sixth amendment/Massiah reasoning provides a 
stronger, but ultimately ineffective, basis for a per se rule 
preventing a suspect from waiving counsel after first invoking 
it. The proper inquiry is whether the waiver was intelligent, 
knowing, and voluntary. On the facts of this case, I am 
inclined to think that there was such a waiver. 
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Mr. Justice Powell 
Paul Cane 
November 6, 1980 
Edwards v. Arizona 
-
/ 
In answer to your question, petitioner 
Edwards was to have been taken before a magistrate at 1:30 
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Recir culated : ______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl ~ 
No, 79-5269 J~ 
Robert Edwards, Petitioner,10 n r. f C . . ~th ~ ~ n nnt o ert1oran to e
v, . Supreme Court of Arizona,/ .4 _ _ , 1 ~ . State of Arizona. ~- /~ ~~ 
[January-, 1981] ~~~ 
JusTICE WHI'l'E delivered the opiuion of the Court~-
We granted certiorari in this case, 446 U.S.-. limited to~ /J /< W 
question one presented in the petition, which in relevant part~~ 
was :'whether the_ Fifth, Sixtn , and Fourteent_h A.me1:dments ~/4./-m 
reqmres suppression of a post-arrest confess10n. which was 
obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to consu1t ~ 
counsel before further interrogation; . . . ,"  
I ~-&...e__ 
On January 19, 1976, a sworn complaint was filed against~ ~ 
Edwards in Arizona state coui-t charging him with robbery~
1 
burglary, and first-degree murder.1 Au arrest warrant was 
issued pursuant to the complaint, and Edwards was arreste ___ ~ 
at his home 1ater that same day. At the police station, he ..ev-,,. ~ 
was informed_ of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, ~ 
394 U. S. 436 (1966). Petitio11er stated that he understood~ . {/ -. 
his rights, and was willing to s~bmit to questio11ing. After~ 
being told that another suspect already in custody had impli-
cated him ii1 the crime, Edwards denied involvement and~ '-'-
gave a taped statement presenting an alibi defense. He the1\•~. 
sought to "make a deal." The interrogati11g officer told him~~~ 
that he wanted a statement, but that he did not have the ~t-~ 
1 The facts stated in text are for the 1110:;t part taken from the opinion~ A ~ 
of the Supreme Court of Arizona. /4. /.l-,/2-LL  
~u- /2 ~
 ¼z 
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authority to negotiate a deal. The officer provided Edwards 
with the number of a county attorney. Petitione~ made the 
call, but hung up after .a few moments. Edwards then said, 
"I want an attorney before making a deal." At that point, 
questioning cease an wards was ta en to county jail. 
At 9: 15 a. m. the next morning, two detectives, colleagues 
-~ 
of the officer who had interrogated Edwards the previous 
night, came to the jail and asked to see Edwards. When the 
detention officer informed Ed-;-ards that thedetectives wished 
to speak with him, he replied that h . · to talk to 
anyone. The guard told im that 'he ha " to tal and then 
~n to rneet with t e detectives. - ' e o cers identified 
themselves, stated they wanted to talk to him. and informed 
him of his Miranda rights. Edwards was wil1iug ~o ta:lk, but 
he first wanted to hear the taped staterneut of the alleged 
accomplice who had implicated him." After listeuing to the 
tape for several minutes. petitioner said that he would make 
a statement so long as it was not tape Tecorded. The de-
tectives informed him that the recording was irrelevant since 
they could testify in court concerning whatever he said. Ed-
1 
wards replied "I'll tell you auything you want to know, but 
I don't want it on tape." He thereupon implicated himself 
in the crime. 
Prior to trial , Edwards moved to suppress his confession 
on the ground that his Miranda rights had been violated 
when the officers returned to question him after he had in-
voked his right to counsel. The trial court initially granted 
the motion to suppress/ but reversed its ruling when pre-
sented with a supposedly controlling decision of a higher Ari-
2 It appears from the record that the detectives had brought the tape 
recording with them. 
3 The trial judge emphasized that the detectives had met with Edwards 
on January 20, without being reque;ted by Edwards to do so and con-
cluded that they had ignored his request for coLm~el made the previcus 
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zona court.4 The court stated without explanation that it 
found Edwards statement to be voluntary. Edwards was 
tried twice and convicted.5 Evidence concerning his con-
fession was admitted at both trials. 
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Edwards 
had invoked both his right to remain silent and his right to 
counsel during the interrogation conducted on the night of 
January 19.6 The court then went on to determine, however, 
that Edwards had waived both rights during the January 20 
meeting when he voluntarily gave his statement to the de-
tectives after again being informed that he need not answer 
questions and that he need not answer w;thout the advice of 
counsel: "The trial court's finding that the waiver and con-
fession wlre voluntarily and knowingly made is upheld." 
II 
We deal first with Edwards' claim that he was deprived of 
his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment as made 
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U. S. 335 (1963). In Mass1'ah v. 
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), the Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises whenever an accused 
has been indicted or adversary criminal proceedings have 
otherwise begun. We further found that this right is violated 
t) - when admissions are ~ bsequently elicited from the accused in 
the absence of counsel. In this case, Edwards asserts that at 
the time of his arrest, formal proceedings had already been 
institu~~is statement ma e rn response o the ---------
4 The case was State v. Travi:s. 26 Ariz. App. 24, 545 P. 2d 986 (1975). 
5 The jury in the fir:st trial wn.-; Lmable to rrach a verdict. 
6 This is,me was disputed by the State. The court, while finding that the 
question was arguable, held that- Edwards' request for an attomey to 
assist him in negotiating- a dra l was ' ·,;uflicient ly clear" within the contrxt 
of the interrogation tlmt it ''must be interpreted a:s a request for coum;c1 
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detectives' post-arrest questioning without benefit of counsel 
was contrary to his Sixth Amendment right under Mass :'ah 
Our difficulty with petitioner's Mass1:ah claim is twofold. 
While initially conceding in its ~merits 
that Edwards' right to counsel under Massiah attached im-
mediately after he was formally charged,7 the State in its 
supplemental brief 8 and during oral argument O took the 
position that under Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682. 6S9 
(1979), and Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. ·220, 226-227 (1977), 
the filing of the formal complaint did not constitute the Had-
versary judicial criminal proceedings" necessary to trigger the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under the state consti-
tution, "No person shall be prosecuted criminally in any court 
of record for felony or misdemeanor. otherwise than by infor-
mation or indictment; no person shall be prosecuted for 
felony by information without having had a preliminary ex-
amination before a magistrate or having waived such pre-
liminary examination." Ariz. Const., Art. 2, § 30. The state 
contends that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does 
ri5Patfach until either tne constitutionall re uired ind~t-
ment or information is file or at least no earlier than the 
pre nnmary nearing o whicha defenclaut is entitled if the 
-~
matter proceeds by complaint.10 In support of its position,, 
7 Re:,;pondent's Brief, at 24, n. 47. 
8 Respondent 's Supplemental Brief, at 2. 
9 Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-46. 
10 Under Arizona law, a felony prosecution may be commenced by way 
of a complaint, 17 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann . Rulr:;; of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 2.2. The complaint is a "written statement of the essential facts 
consistituting a public offense, made upon oath before a magistrate," id., 
Rule 2 3, upon which the magi;;t rat e either i::;;;ue:; an arrest warra.nt or 
dism'sses the complaint. Id .. Rule 2.4. Once arre;;ted , the accrn,ed must 
be taken b efore the magist rate for a hea ring. Id .. Rule 4.1. At that 
hea ring, the magistrate ascertains the accused's true name and addres;;, 
and informs him of the charges aga inst him , his right to coun;;el, his right 
to remain silent, and his right to a preliminar~· hearing if charged via 
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the state relies, on Moore v. Illinois, supra, where after recog-
nizing that under Illinois law "the prosecution in this cas2 
was commenced-when the victim's complaint was filed ;11 
court," we noted that "adversary judicial criminal proceed-
ings" were initiated when the ensuing preliminary hearing 
occurred. Moore, supra, at 228.11 
We are especially reluctant to reject the State's position 
given the fact that the Arizona Supreme Court did not address 
this issue. This silence leads to our second difficulty with 
p~~laim. The motion to suppress filea·in 
the trial court did no~fer to the Sixth Amendment or cite 
any Sixth Amendment cases, but relied solely on the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964) , and M :randa v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The supporting memorandum 
mentioned the Sixth Amendment only in the course of assert-
ing that Edwards had sought to "invoke his Miranda rights 
under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments .... " Further-
more, the OJ)inion of the Arizona Sgpreme Court dealt only - ~ ~ ... 
with the Miranda issue arising from petitioner·s Fifth Amend----------------ment privilege. Absent express consideration of the Sixth 
Amendment claim, Edwards' right to pui·sue that legal aveuue 
depends on whether the issue was properly raised and there-
fore necessarily, albeit s; lently, decided by the Supreme Court 
of Arizona. Edwards insists that the question was raised and 
argued in his brief on appeai , but the fact remains that the 
Sixth Amendment ground was not raised in the trial court 
and was ignored by trie iITIZona S'tipreme Court. In situa-
tions "where the highest state court has failed to pass upon a 
tnke place no later than 10 da~•,; after the defpndant i,; plnced i11 custody. 
Id ., Rule 5.1 . The purpo,;r of the !waring b to det ermine whether proba.-
ble ra use exists to hold the defendant. for trial. Id. , Rule 5.3. 
11 Compare United States v. Duvall, 537 F . 2d 15 (CA2 1976). where 
it was held that the filing of a complaint a11d the i::;:;ua11ce of an arrest 
\\·arrant did not, trigger the right to cou11sel under l8 1xth Amendment, but 
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federal question, it will be assumed that the omission was 
due to want of proper presentation in the state court unless 
the aggrieved party can affirmatively show the contrary." 
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 582 (1969). See Fuller v. 
Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974); Bailey v. Anderson, 
326 U.S. 203, 206-207 (1945); Chicago, Indianapolis & Louis-
ville R. Co. v. McGuire, 196 U. S. 128, 131-133 (1905).12 
Our jurisdiction to review state court judgments under 28 
U. S. C. § 1257 is confined to "[f] inal j u<lgme11ts or decrees 
rendered by the highest court of a state i11 which a decision 
can be had." The failure to obtain decision of the highest 
state court upon an issue is a jurisdictional bar to review 
here. Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969). In light 
of these circumstances, we do not decide the questio11 whether 
Edwards' right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteellth 
Amendments was violated and proceed to his claim that he 
was deprived of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteeuth 
Amendments.13 
III 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (19oG). the Court 
determined that the Fifth and Fourteeuth Ame11dme11t's pro-
hibition against compelled self-incrimination required that 
custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to the putative 
12 Our Rule 21 (h) requires that a petition for certiorari contain suffi-
cient. inform,~tion for the Court to aJ;:;'\lrc it;,e]f that the federal que,;tion 
wa.s timely and properly tai.,;ed and tlwt the Court l1a.,; juri:;diction to re-
view the i;;sue 011 writ tif certiorari . It may be tha.t de,;pite the failure 
to pre;;ent the Sixth Amendment claim in conuection with the motion to 
suµpre,;:;, the i:,;,suc wa.,; properly before the Arizona Supreme Court , but 
petitioner has not convinced U:S that t-hi:-< is the ea;;e. It is wo11.h 11oti11g 
that alt hough the fil':;t qu<>~tion pre~ented in tlw pet ition l'or certiorari re-
ferred to the Sixth Amendment, the body of the petition relied ;;o]ely on 
the Miranda line of case:; nnd t.he Fit't.h Amendmrnt. 
13 For similar reaso11s, we do not addre:;,: Edward,; ' :;;ubmi.,;:;ion that for 
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defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the 
right to the presence of an attorney. Id., at 479. 'l'he Court 
also indicated the procedures to be followed subsequent to the 
warnings. If the accused indicates that he wishes to remain 
silent, "the interrogation must cease." If he requests coun-
sel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pres-
ent." 384 U. S., at 474. 
Miranda thus declared that an accused has a Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to have couusel present during 
custodial interrogation. Here, the critical facts as found by 
the Arizona Supreme Court are that Edwards asserted his 
right to counsel and his right to remain silent on January 19, 
but that the police returned the next morning to confront him 
and as a result of the meetiug secured incriminating oral 
admissions. Edwards first insists that because he invoked his 
right to counsel on January 19, the subsequent meeting on 
the 20th was prohibited since his right, once i"nvoked, was not 
waivable. 
We do not agree. Our cases have consistently held that 
the right to counsel, though of fundamental importance, may 
be waived upon a proper showing. Faretta v. Calif orni,a, 422 
U.S. 806,835 (1975 ); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 
317 U. S. 269, 275 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 
(1938). See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 374 
(1979). In this regard, the right to counsel resembles other 
constitutional rights which this Court has held to be waiv-
able.14 We are unconvinced that Miranda intended to estab-
14 See, e. g., Michigan v. ·Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 (1975) (Fifth Amend-
ment right to remain silent) : Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 
(1973) (Fourth Amendment) ; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1971) 
(speedy trial); Brookhart v. Janis. 384 U. S. 1 (1970) (Confrontation 
Clause); Green\'. United State/!. 355 U.S. 184 (1961) (double jeopardy); 
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann. 317 U.S. 269 (Hl42) (jury trial). 
See generally Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) ("[c]ourts re-
peat.edly must deal with these i:":;ue,,; of waiver with regard to a variety 
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lisl1 a contrary rule in the context of custodial interrogations. 
Indeed, in Miranda itself the Court expressly stated that the 
accused '~ and intelli ·ently wruve" the right to 
counse to w ich he is required to be advised. Miranda, 
supra, 384 U. S., at 479. The Court's statement that in-
terrogation must cease until counsel is present once the ac-
cused invokes his right to counsel was not intended to fore-
close a subsequent relinquishment of that right. 
This view is confirmed by our own cases subsequent to 
11firanda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).15 In Rhode Island 
v. Innis, 446 U. S. - (1980). a case where the accused had 
expressed his desire for counsel but where we found that there 
,./ - had been no sebsequent "in terrogation ." the Court thought 
it unnecessary to "reach the question whether the respondent 
-i 5 Our decision is also Ruppork cl by vnriou~ deei,;ion.~ of the Courts of 
Appeal finding that a. rnlid wai,·er of an accu,;ed ',- prcvioui,;]~- invokPd Fifth 
AmendmPnt right t o cmmsel is pos.,;ible. Sce, e. g. , White v. Finkbeirte1', 
611 F . 2d 186, 191 (CA7 1979) ("in certain in,-tances, for various re:1;;011s, 
a person in ru~tody who hal" pre,·iousl~- requc,-ted co1mo.'!'l may knowingly 
and volun tarily decide tha t he 11 0 longer wi"h(•:,: to be repr~ enterl by 
counsel" ) , cert,. 1wnding Ko. 79- 6601; K l:' mwd y v. Fairman. 6U~ F. 2d 1242 
(CA7 1980) ; United States v. R odriguez-Gastelum . 5fi9 F . 2d -!82 (CA9) 
(en ba.nc) (:;ta.ting that it make,; no seuse to hold that once an accused 
has reque;;,1:ed coun:;el, "prisoner ma~· never, until he has actually t alked 
with counsel, change his mind and decide to spe,1k with the police without 
an attorney being pre:;Pnt"), cert . denied , -!36 U. S. 919 (1978). See gen-
erally Cobbs v. R obinson. 528 F . 2d 1381, 1342 (CA2 19i5) ; United States 
v. Grant, 549 F . 2d 942 (CA4 1977 ), vacated 0 11 other ground:,; sub ·nom. 
Whitehead v. United States, 435 U. S. 912 (1978) ; United States v. Hart, 
619 F . 2d 325 (CA4 1980) ; U11ited States " · 1-la.uck. 58() F. 2d 1296 (CAS 
1978). The rule in tlrn Fiftli Circui t i:; tha t a knowing and intelligent 
waiver cannot be found once tl1e Fiftli Amendment right to counsel has 
been clearly invoked unless the accused initia·te::: the. renewed contact. See, 
e. g., United States v. Massey, 550 F . 2d 300 (CA5 1977 ); United States v. 
Priest, 409 F. 2d 491 (CA5 1969·) . Waiver is possible, however, when the 
request for coun::lel is equivocal N ash v. Estelle, 597 F . 2d 513 (CA5 
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waived his right under Miranda to be free from interroga-
tion until counsel was present." Id., at-, n. 2. It is thus 
implicit in Innis that a valw, waiver of the right demanded 
could occur. Likewise, in 1:ffrewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 
(1977), a case where th£ institution of adversary criminal 
} proceedings triggered the accusect\ Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, the Court made it clear that it was not holding that 
the accused could not, without notice to counsel, waive his 
rights. We, therefore, agree with the Arizona Supreme Court 
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed and 
applied in Miranda do not render the accused totally power-
less to countermand his request for counsel and waive his 
rights against further custodial interrogation in the abseuce 
of an attorney. 
l We disagree, however, with the Arizona Supreme Court M to th~ropriate'standard for de~mi1w1g waiver ~e the accusecl has specincaTiy 1nvoked his right to counsel. It is 
reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel 
must not only be voluntary, but constitute a knowing and 
intelligent relinquishrneut or abandonment of a known right 
or privilege, a matter which depends . in each case "upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, in-
cluding the background, experience and conduct of the ac-
cused." Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, at 464; North Carolina v. 
Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 374-375 (1978); Brewer v. Williams , 
430 U. S. 387, 404 (1977) ; Fair v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 
724-725 (1979). 
Considering the proceedings in the state courts in the light 
of this standard, we note that in denying petitioner's motion 
to suppress, the trial court found the admission to have been 
"voluntary," Jt. App. 3, 95, without separately focusing on 
whether Edwards had knowingly and iuteff gently relin-
quished his right to counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court, 
in a section of its opinion entitled "Voluntariness of Waiver," 
stated that in Arizona coufessio11s are prima facie in voluntary 
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ponderance of the evidence that the confession was freely 
and voluntarily made. The court stated that the issue of 
voluntariness should be determined based on the totality of 
the circumstances as it related to whether an accused's action 
was "knowing and intelligent and whether his will was over-
borne." Once the trial court determines that "the confession 
is voluntary, the finding will not be upset on appeal absent 
clear and manifest error." Jt. App. 18-19. The court then 
upheld the trial court's finding that the "waiver and con-
fession were voluntarily and knowingly made." Jt. App. 19. 
In referring to the necessity to find Edwards' confes-
sion knowing and intelligent, the State Supreme Court cited 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 226 (1973). Yet, 
it is clear that Schneckloth does not control the issue presented 
in this case. The issue in Schneckloth was under what con-
ditions an individual could be found to have consented to a 
search and thereby waive his Fourth Amendment rights. The 
Court declined to impose the "intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege" standard and re-
quired only that the consent be voluntary under the totality 
of the circumstances. The Court specifically noted that the 
right to counsel was a prime example of those rights requir-
ing the special protection of the knowing and intelligent 
waiver standard, id., at 24:2, but held that "The considerations 
that informed the Court's holding in Miranda are simply in~ 
applicable in the present case." 412 U. S., at 246. Schneck-
loth itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent 
or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries. Here, how-
ever sound the conclusion of the state courts as to the volun-
tariness of Edwards' admission may be, neither the trial court 
nor the Arizona Supreme Court undertook to focus on whether 
Edwards understood his right to counsel and intelligently and 
knowingly relinquished it. It is thus apparent that the deci-
sion below misunderstood the requirement for findiug a valid 
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There is more to be said in this connection. We have held 
? 
' 
that an express relinquishment of the right to counsel is not 
essential for a finding of a valid waiver when a suspect, with-
out invoking his right to silence or to counsel, responds to 
interrogation after initially being advised of his Miranda 
rights. North Carolina v. Butler, supra. But the Court has I · 
strongly indicated that the situation changes and that addi-
tional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for 
counsel,1° and we now hold that when an accused invokes his ~ 
rightto counsel ,prior to or during custodial interrogation , a 
vaiicfwaivercannot be shown by rovin onl that the ac:-
cuse respon ed to questions after being advIBed 0TT1is rights, 
even if the second confrontation follows the elapse of a signifi-
1 
cant interval of time. There must be some other evidence 
that the accused not only understood his right to counsel, but 
that e inte 1gentlv an knowingly relinquished it. 
In Brewer v. i iams, supra, where, as 111 Massiah v. United 
States , 377 U. S. 201 (1963) , the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had accrued. the Court held that a valid waiver of 
counsel rights should not be inferred from the mere response 
by the accused to overt or more subtle forms of interrogat1an 
or other efforts to elicit incriminating information. In Mas-
16 Miranda v. Al'izona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) itself indi ~ated that asser-
tions of the rights to silence and to counsel were substantial and significant. 
events. Subsequently, in Michigan v. Mosley, -423 U. S. 96 (1975), the 
court noted tha.t Miranda bad distinguished between the procedural safe-
guards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attor-
ney and had required that interrogation cease until an attorney was 
present only if the individual stat ed fha( he wanted counsel. 42.'3 U. S., 
at 104, n. 10. In Ferr v. Michael C, -!42 U.S. 707, 710 (1979) , the Court 
referred to Miranda's " rigid rule fhat an accused's request for an attorne~• 
is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights requiring that all 
interrogation cease " And just last Term , in a case where a suspect in 
custody had invoked his Miranda right. to counsel. the Court again re-
ferred to the "undi,;putecl right " under Miranda to remain ,;i lent and to 
b~ free of interrogation "until ·he had ron,;ulted with a lawyer: ' Rhocle 









EDWARDS v. ARIZONA 
-
siah and Brewer, counsel had been engaged or appointed and 
the admissions in question were elicited in his absence. But 
in McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.-S. 356 (1965), we summarily af-
firmed a decision that the police could not elicit information 
after indictment even though counsel had not yet been 
appointed. 
With respect to its purpose and reach, the Miranda right to 
counsel, which arises under the Fifth Amendment, is no doubt 
distinguishable from the right that attaches under the Sixth 
Amendment after indictment or adversary proceedings have 
begun. But once invoked by the accused before or during the 
course of custodial interrogation:-the Fifth Amendment right 
for waiver purposes is sufficiently similar to the pretrial Sixth 
Amendment right that waiver 1s not to be implied from the 
mere willingness to respond to interro at10n after additional 
warnings. We do not suggest that in either the Fifth or Sixth 
Amendment situations, a valid waiver may occur only if the 
accused expressly waives his right to counsel after being 
taken before a judge and advised of his rights. Neither do we 
insist that waiver must always be in writing, however desira-
ble that result might be. We do hold. however, that when an I 
accused has i~voked his right to counsel after Miranda warn- }~ 
ings, a su6sequent waiver of that right cauuot be found unless 
the accused fs aware o-f fiis-· rior request for counsel, under-
stan s t at 11s re uest will be honored if e so desire~d 
chooses to orego that ri ht. 
The tate now msists that the present record is adequate to 
show that Edwards' conduct satisfied the applicable waiver 
standard. But it is not for us to sift through the entire record 
in the first instance to arrive at the necessary findings and 
c01;clusious. The trial court made no findings in support of 
its ultimate ruling other than that the confession was volun-
tary. Furthermore, the facts of the case as stated by the Ari-
zona Supreme Court, which we accept for present purposes, do 
po:t '.the:i1ilselves w11rrant a conclusion th11t Edward$ w,aived hfo 
-
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acknowledged right to have counsel present on the morning 
of January 20. 
Those facts show that the officer conducting the interroga-
tion on the evening of January 19 ceased interrogation when 
Edwards requested counsel. The next morning two of his 
colleagues again met with Edwards. a11d uot at Edwards' sug-
gestion or request.11 Indeed, Edwards informed the detention 
officer that he did not want to talk to anyone. At the meet-
ing, the detectives told Edwards that they wanted to talk with 
him and again advised him of his Miranda rights. Edwards 
stated that he would talk , but what prompted this action does 
not appear. He listened, at his own request. to part of the 
taped statement made by one of his alleged accomplices and 
then made an incriminating statement. Although Edwards 
had again been advised of his right to counsel, as far as the 
facts recited by the Arizona Supreme Court reveal , there was 
no mention of Edwards' previous request for counsel and no 
oral or written waiver or relinquishment of that right other 
than by the voluntary incriminating statement made by Ed-
wards. Accordingly, there is no indication on the facts as 
found by the state court that Edwards understood and affirm-
atively waived his Fifth Amendme11t right to counsel after he 
had previously invoked such right.18 
The short of it is that the State must prove by sufficient 
evidence that Edwards voluntarily, knowingly . and intelli-
gently relinquished the right to counsel that lie had previously 
cl~imed. As we have said , it does not appear to us that the 
Arizona Supreme Court proceeded under that standard. Fur-
thermore, when examined with the applicable legal standard 
17 The requirements of Miranda are inapplicable unle,;.,; there is cus-
todial interrogation. Volunteered ::;t,atemPnt,; or conl'e,;sion,; of the ac-
cu:;ed are uot dealt with i11 this opinion. 
1 8 We need not decide whether there would have beeu a valid waiver of 
counsel had the events of January 20 been the fir:;t and only interrogation 
to which Edwards had been subjected. Cf. North Caroliua v. Butler, 441 
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in mind, the facts appearing in the opinion of the State Su-
preme Court do not demonstrate that a valid waiver of Ed-
wards' right to counsel occurred in this case. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is accord-
. ingly reversed and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings' not inconsistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
" 
C HAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE B Y RON R . WHITE 
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j;ttpttmt <lf01trl Gf tlrt ~.ro ~ l:au,s' 
~ ~~-<If. 20ffe'l-~ 
December 18, 1980 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 79-5269 - Edwards v. Arizona 
V' 
The Conference vote was to decide this case on Massiah 
and remand for reconsideration under the standards of that 
case. The draft I am now circulating does not follow this 
course because there are more problems than I had 
anticipated with determining that adversary criminal 
proceedings had begun with the filing of a complaint against 
Edwards. As I see it, applying Massiah here would 
considerably extend that decision. 
The draft does conclude, however, that the Arizona 
Supreme Court applied the wrong legal standard in 
determining that there was a waiver of the Miranda right to 
counsel in this case. It also concludes that on the 
undisputed facts stated in the Arizona Supreme Court opinion 
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-
.§uprtmt QJou:rt o-f Utt ~th !Matts-
'J)iaslp:ngLm~ If]. QJ. 21lffe'1:, 
December 19, 1980 
Re: No. 79-5269 Edwards v. Arizona 
Dear Byron: 
/ 
In due course I will circulate an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part. 
sincerely, / . 
~,/"'-✓ 
Mr. Justice White 




- -~upumc <qonrt ttf tfy~ ~nilih- ~hiliil 
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.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMU N 
December 23, 1980 
Re : No . 79-5269 - Edwards v. Arizona 
Dear Byron : 
I have read with interest your proposed opinion in this 
case and have concluded , with some regret , that I cannot Join 
it in its present form . The following outlines my difficulty: 
Although I agree with the decision no t to rest the case 
on Sixth Amendment grounds, I am troubled by that portion of 
the opinion that suggests that the Massiah issue was not 
properly rais e d in the Ari zona Supreme Court. Edwards 
adamantly says it wa s . Se e Supplemental Brief for Petitioner 
1, n. 2. It does not seem right that the Arizona Supreme 
Court should be able to ins ulate the question from review by 
not passing on it. Yet is that not the i mport of the opinion? 
I have now reached the po int in my ow n tqinking that if 
we ar e to live wi th Mi rand a -- and I, like you , am no g re at 
fan of that decision -- I think we should hold that that case 
creates a~ se rule barring further interrogation by police 
once a suspec t has invoked his right to cou nsel, unless the 
subseque nt i nterrogation wa s initi ated by the ~defendant . 
Your opinion , as I read it, r e j ects this approach. - - Footnot e 
15 indicates t ha t a t least the Fifth Circuit has adopted that 
rule . It also approx imat e s wha t is sugges t e d by Judge 
Goodwin and two others , concu rri ng and di ssenting, in United 
Sta~e s v. Rod~i guez-Gastelurn , 56 9 F.2d 48 2, 48 8 (CA9 e n 
bane ), cert . denied , 436 U.S . 919 (1978 ). I think, too , it 
has been suggested in some concurring and dissent i ng opinions 
here , and wa s a t leas t inti:nated in Fare v. Michae l C., 44 2 
U.S . 707, 718-719, 726-727 (1979). --
I should st.:ite , also , tha t I do no t ful ly understand the 
s tress placed on the accused 's being aware of his prior 
requests for counse l (pp . 12 and 13 ). 1dho bette r tha n lhe 
accused will be awar e of any prior request s he made ? Mus t 
the police go s o far a s to remind him tha t he previously 
requested counsel ? I wonder . 
, 
,,. - - Pag e 2. 
Finally, I am not convinced that, as the draft states, the 
Arizona court failed to focus on whether petitioner understood 
his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly waived 
it. It seems to me that that court considered the issues of 
knowledge and intelligence to be part of the voluntariness 
inquiry. There may be some semantic confusion in the court's 
opinion, but there is a cl e ar finding that "the waiver and 
confession wer e voluntarily and knowingly made ." App. 19. 
In summary, then , I have my problems . I may wait to see 
what Bill Rehnqu ist has to say. Or I may separate ly concur. 
Sincerely , 
J~J--
',Ii:- • ,Just i c e i•Jh j t e 
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
December 23, 1980 
Re: No. 79-5269 - Edwards v. Arizona 
Dear Byron: 
I have read wit h inter e st your proposed opinion in this 
case and have concluded, with some regret , tha t I cannot join 
it in its present form. The following outline s my difficulty: 
Although I agree with the decision no t to rest the case 
on Sixth Amendment ground s, I am troubled by that portion of 
the opinion that suggest s that the Massiah issue was not 
properly raised in the Arizona Supreme Court. Edward s 
adamantly says it was . See Supplementa l Brief for Petitioner 
1, n. 2. It doe s no t seem right tha t the Arizona Supreme 
Court should be able to insulate the question from review by 
not passing on it . Ye t is that not the import of the opinion ? 
I have now reached the poin t in my own tqinking tha t if 
we are to live with Miranda -- and I, like you , am no great 
fan of that decision -- I think we should hold that that case 
create s a~ se rule barring further interrogation by police 
once a suspec t has invoked his right to counsel , unless the 
subsequen t inter rogation was initiated by the ~defendant . 
You r opin ion , a s I read it , rejects this approach . ~ otnote 
15 indicates that at leas t the Fifth Circuit has adopted that 
rule . It also approximate s wha t is suggested by Judge 
Goodwin and two others , concurring and dissenting , in United 
S1=._~tc~ v. Rodr_ig~_~z-Gastelurn , 569 F.2d 48 2, 488 (CA9 e n 
),rnc ), cert . denied , 436 U.S . 919 (1978) . I think, too , it 
h.--is been sugcy~s led in some concurring and di sscnt ing opinions 
here , and wa s at le2.s t intimated in Fare v. Michael C. , 44 2 
U.S. 707 , 718-719, 726-727 (1979 ). --
I should state, also , that I do no t fully understand the 
stres s placed on the accused ' s being awar e of his pt i 0 r 
reque::;ts for counsel (pp . 12 u.nd 13 ). Who better than the 
accused wil l be aware of a ny prior requests he made ? Mus t 
the police go so far as to r c~mi nd him that he previously 
requested counsel ? I ~ondcr . 
~ 
- - Page 2. 
Final ly, I am not convinced that , a s the draft states, the 
Arizona court failed to focus on whether petitioner understood 
his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly waived 
it. It seems to me that that court cons i dered the issues of 
knowledge and intelligence to be part of the voluntariness 
inquiry . There may be some semantic confusion in the court's 
opinion, but there is a clear finding tha t "the wa iver and 
confession were voluntarily and knowingly made ." App. 19 . 
In summary , then , I have my problems . I may wai t to see 
wha t Bil l Rehnquist has to say . Or I may separa tely concur. 
Mr. Justice White 




MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: December 29, 1980 
RE: No. 79-5269, Edwards v. Arizona 
I agree with most of what you say in your 
proposed memorandum. Justice White does seem to go too far 
in spelling out precisely what conditions must be fulfilled 
before a "waiver" will be found. 
I offer two additional thoughts. First, I 
think Justice Blackmun may be correct in suggesting that the 
Massiah issue is properly before the Court. Petr contends 
that he presented that issue to the state supreme court. 
Before concluding that the issue is not properly here, I 
think the Court should examine the briefs from the lower 
court. 
Second, I am not as troubled as you were by 
the reference to an accused who "invokes his right to 
counsel prior to or during custodial interrogation." As you 
point out, that sentence implies that Miranda applies even 
before custodial interrogation. I do not think Justice 
White intended to suggest that; rather, I think he meant to 
say that an accused who asks for counsel before he was 
entitled to counsel has effectively invoked his right should 
a custodial interrogation later commence. 
small drafting change could clear this up. 
{)~ 
I suspect that a 
P.W.C. 12/29/80 
December 29, 1980 
I agree that the right to counsel, having once 
,, been claimed, nevertheless may be waived subsequently 
provided the state proves that the waiver was "knowingly 
intelligently" made. I am troubled, however, by some of 
your "holding• language on pages 11 and 12. 
: ·•jr.g: 
First, my understanding of Miranda is that it,,Jl 
applies only to custodial interrogation. On page 11 you 
refer to an accused who • invokes his right to counsel prior , •. 
1Q or during custodial interrogation•. 
And on page 12, your "holding" sentence states 
"When an accused has invoked his right to counsel 
after Miranda warnings, a subsequent waiver of 
that right cannot be found unless the accused is 
aware of his prior request for counsel, 
understands that his request will be honored if he 
so desires, and chooses to forego that right.• 
- 7 1 ~ - ,.: --~~.,~r •. _ 
:F,. '-'~ ~:F"~ ..;,1!,.-;;:~~:""·: 
I am troubled by spelling out these specifics 1 ,,8),-t"'.i~ 
without making clear that whether a waiver is made knowingly ,. ·• -!~~ 
and intelligently de~ends on the facts and circumstances, -~_ ~ ~~ 
and these may vary widely. · ~== ~~., :i. 
I agree that there is sufficient doubt in this 
case to reverse the judgment and remand the case. A 
critical fact for me is that when the two detectives wished 
to interrogate petitioner the next morning, he stated that 
he did not want to talk. This reaffirmed his position when 
Miranda warnings were given him earlier. The prison guard, 
however, told petitioner that he •bad" to talk to the 
detectives. This element of compulsion could be sufficient 
to offset a second giving of Miranda warnings. If .. 
31-,-.., .--.... - - 2. 
petitioner, when told that the detectives wished to 
interrogate him, had simply replied that he would be glad to 
talk to them, and if Miranda warnings had been repeated and 
petitioner expressed his understanding, this would be 
sufficient for me. It would be unnecessary for the state to 
prove that petitioner was •aware of his prior request for 
counsel" or to prove specifically that he understood "his 
request [would] be honored if he so desired". 
Perhaps I am unduly concerned, but I am afraid the 
•holding" sentences on pages 11 and 12 will be read as 
creating a new and more specific formula rather than relying 
on the traditional "knowingly and intelligently" waiver 
standard. 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMB ER S OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
- -.§u:prmtt (!Jourl of tJrt ~th .§tatt.tr 
~frin.gf:on, ~- QJ. 20,;rJI,~ 
December 31, 1980 
Re: 79-5269 - Edwards v. Arizona 
Dear Harry, Lewis and Bill, 
I appreciate your comments on the circulating draft in 
this case. It is of some momen t that we arrive at a Court 
opinion and settle the dispute among the circuits with 
respect to the issue before us. Accordingly, whe n mor e 
Justices have spoken, I shall seriously consider making 
whatever changes may be necessary to effect that result. Of 
course, I hope that revisions will not be necessary at all, 
and it is apparent that I cannot satisfy all of you in any 
event. For now, I shall await other responses. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
~~ 
C H AMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTT E R STE WART 
- -~u:p-t tutt <qllttrt of iltt ~ it ~faug 
'Ji a$ fri:n.giott, ~ . <!J. 2 Offe '! ~ / 
De cember 29, 1980 
Re: 79-5269 - Edwards v. Arizona 
Dear Byron, 




Copies to the Conference 
:1 ')' 
I . . 
/ 
\ - -.§U+Tttmt <.qourt of tqe 'J[trifeh .§ta.in 
~asfrington, Ii}. <.q. 20ffeJ.l..;1 ✓ 
CHAMBERS OF 
IU STICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~ . 
~ p ;{ ~ ~ December 31, 1980 
Re: No. 79-5269 Edwards v '. ).,{;i ! ona 
Dear Byron: 
As indicated by my previous letter in this case, I have 
some difficulty with the draft opinion. In light of the 
various correspondence which has been circulated, however, I 
have decided it may be best for me to state my areas of 
concern before going ahead with a separate opinion. 
I agree that we should not base a decision in this case 
on Massiah and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for the 
reasons stated in Part II of your draft. I also agree fully 
that the right to counsel, once invoked, may be waived, and 
therefore am happy to join in the rejection of any per se 
rule against waiver of th is right. Draft Op. at 7-9. ( In 
this context I am somewhat concerned with the discussion of 
the Fifth Circuit rule on page 8, n. 15. Since the opinion 
indicates a finding of waiver is at least possible in this 
case, and since Edwards did not initiate the renewed contact 
with the officers, I take it that the Fifth Circuit rule 
that waiver can be found only when the accused initiates the 
renewed contact is to be rejected, and would specifically 
note th is.) 
I am troubled, however, by the draft's discussion of 
the appropriate standards by which waiver is to be judged on 
remand. I would much prefer to see the standard applied in 
Schneckloth -- voluntariness under the totality of the 
circumstances -- applied across the board. I sense that it 
is very difficult for police officers to apply differing 
standards of waiver to the vast array of questions which 
come up. Schneckloth's discussion of the appropriate 
standard in Miranda cases was of course dicta, and I regard 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) as seriously flawed. 
Nonetheless I could probably join an opinion using the 
"knowing and intelligent" waiver standard. 
,. - -- 2 -
I probably will not, however, be able to join an 
opinion further fragmenting the appropriate waiver standard 
by requiring a greater showing for waivers of the right to 
counsel than for the right to remain silent. I understand 
the draft to be breaking new ground in this regard, at least 
so far as concerns the Fifth Amendment. A two-tier test is 
bad enough; a three-tier test imposes an intolerable burden 
on law enforcement officers, who we hope will be able to 
apply our decisions in practice. 
The difficulty in cutting the loaf too thin is, I 
think, shown in the particular additional requirements the 
draft would impose prior to finding a waiver of the right to 
counsel as opposed to the right to remain silent. For 
example, the draft stresses that the accused be "aware of 
his prior request for counsel", 12, but presumably he would 
be in every case, amnesiacs aside . It also seems clear from 
the record that Edwards was in fact aware of his prior 
request when he met with the second group of officers. He 
testified below that he did not ask for an attorney at the 
second meeting because he "didn't think you had to keep 
asking for a [sic] attorney over and over and over." J.A. 
84. This certainly shows awareness, at the time of the 
second meeting, of his prior request . The draft opinion, in 
stressing that an accused be aware of his prior request for 
counsel and understand that a renewed request will be 
honored, holds the danger of being read, at least by the 
police who must work within its bounds , "to require an 
additional question to the already cumbersome Miranda litany 
•••• " Br e we r v. Wi 11 i a ms , 4 3 0 U • S • 3 8 7 , 4 3 6 ( 19 7 7 ) ( Wh it e , 
J., dissenting). 
I am also opposed to saying that waiver cannot be found 
simply on evidence that an accused answered questions 
following Miranda rights. In a particular case an accused 
may show that this is not enough, perhaps when, as here, he 
was told that he "had" to talk to officers after expressing 
the desire not to . Absent such circumstances I do not see 
why answering questions does not · signify a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver of rights which had just 
been specifically enumerated. In any event I would leave 
" - -- 3 -
the question of the result here fully open on remand, and 
would not discuss the evidence as is done in the draft at 
pages 12-13. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice White 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. 79-5269 
Robert Edwards, Petitioner, I O W . f C . . h n nt o ert10ran to t e 
S 
v.A . · Supreme Court of Arizona, 
tate of nzona. 
[January -, 1981] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari in this case, 446 U. S. -, limited to 
question one presented in the petition, which in relevant part 
was "whether th·e Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
requires suppression of a post-arrest confession, which was 
obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to consult 
counsel before further interrogation; " 
I 
On January 19, 1976, a sworn complaint was filed against 
Edwards in Arizona state court charging him with robbery, 
burglary, and first-degree murder.1 An arrest warrant was 
issued pursuant to the complaint, and Edwards was arrested 
at his home later that same day. At the police station, he 
was informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 
394 U. S. 436 (1966). Petitioner stated that he understood 
his rights, and was willing to submit to questioning. After 
being told that another suspect already in custody had impli-
cated him . in the crime, Edwards denied involvement and 
gave a taped statement presenting an alibi defense. He then 
sought to "make a deal." The interrogating officer told him 
that he wanted a statement, but that. he did not have the 
1 The facts stated in text are for the most part taken from the 01)inion 
of the Supreme Court of Arizona. 
2 0 MAR 1981 
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authority to negotiate a deal. The officer provided Edwards 
with the number of a county attorney. Petitioner made the 
call, but hung up after a few moments. Edwards then sa'd, 
"I want an attorney _before making a deal." At that point, 
questioning ceased and Edwards was taken to county jail. 
At 9: 15 ~ he next morning, two detectives, colleagues 
of the officer who had interrogated Edwards the previous 
night, came to the jail an·d asked to see Edwards. When the 
detention officer informed Edwards that the detectives wished 
to speak . with him, he replied that he did not want to talk to 
anyone. The guarcl told him that "he had" to talk and then 
took him to meet with the detectives. The officers ident:fied 
themselves, stated they wanted to talk to him, and informed 
him of his Miranda rights. Edwards was willing to talk, but 
he first wanted to hear the taped statement of the alleged 
accomplice who had implicated him. 2 After listening to the 
tape for several minutes, petitioner said that he would make 
a statement so 1ong as it was not tape recorded. The de-
tectives informed him that the recording was irrelevant since 
they could testify in court concerning whatever he said. Ed-
wards rep1ied "I'll tell you anything you want to know, but 
I don't want it on tape." He thereupon implicated himself 
in the crime. 
Prior to trial , Edwards moved to suppress his confession 
on the ground that his Miranda rights had been violated 
when the officers returned to question him after he had in-
voked his right to counsel The trial court initially granted 
the motion to suppress,3 but reversed its ruling when pre-
sented with a supposedly controlling decis:on of a higher Ari-
2 It appears from the record that the detectives had brought the tape 
recording with them. 
3 The trial judge emphasized that the detectives had met with Edwards 
on January 20, without being requested by Edwards to do so and con-
cluded that they had ignored his request for counsel made the previous 
,evening App. 91-93. 
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zona. court.4 The court stated without explanation that it 
found Edwards statement to be voluntary. Edwards was 
tried twice and convicted. 5 Evidence concerning his con-
fession was admitted at both trials. 
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Edwards 
had invoked both his right to rema~n silent and his right to 
counsel during the interrogation conducted on the night of 
January 19.6 The court then went on to determine, however, 
that Edwards had waived both rights during the January 20 
meeting when he voluntarily gave his statement to the de-
tectives after again being informed that he need not answer 
questions and that he need not answer w:thout the advice of 
counsel: "The trial court's finding that the waiver and con-
fession were voluntarily and knowingly made is upheld." 
Because the use of Edward's confession against him at his 
trial violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as construed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 
436 (1966), we reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme 
Court.7 
4 The case was State v. Travis, 26 Ariz . App. 24, 545 P. 2d 986 (1976). 
5 The jury in the first trial was unable to reach a verdict. 
6 This issue was disputed by the State. The court, while finding that the 
question was arguable, held that Edwards' request for an attorney to 
assist him in negotiating a deal was "~ufficient]y clear" within the context 
of the interrogation that it "must be interpreted as a request for counsel 
and as a request to remain silent until counsel was present." 
7 We thus need not decide Edward's claim that the State deprived him of 
his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as con-
strued and applied in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In 
that ca.se, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises 
whenever an accused has been indicted or adversary criminal proceedings 
have otherwise begun and that this right is violated when admissiors are 
subsequently elicited from the accused in the absence of counsel. While 
initially conceding in its opening brief on the merits that Edwards' right 
to counsel under Massiah attached immediately after he was formally 
charged, the State in its supplemental brief and during oral argument took 
the position that under Kirby v. Illinois , 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1979), and 
i 
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II 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Court 
determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
hibition against compelled self-incrimination required that 
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220, 226-227 (1977), the filing of the formal 
complaint did not constitute the "adversary judicial criminal proceedings" 
necessary to trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under the 
state constitution, "No person shall be prosecuted criminally in any court 
of record for felony or misdemeanor, otherwi8e than by information or 
indictment; no person shall be prosecuted for felony by informa.tion with-
out having had a preliminary examination before a magistrate or having 
waived such preliminary examination." Ariz . -Comt., Art. 2, § 30. The 
State contends that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach 
until either the constitutionally required indictment or information is filed 
or at least no earlier than the preliminary hearing to which a defendant 
is entitled if the matter proceeds by complaint. Under Arizona la.w, a 
felony prosecution may be commenced by way of a complaint, 17 Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule "2.2. The complaint 
is a "written statement of the e:;sential facts constituting a public offense, 
made upon oath before a magistrate," id., Rule '2.3, upon which the 
magistrate either issues an arrest warrant or dismisses the complaint. 
Id., Rule 2.4. Once arrested, the accused must be taken before the 
magistrate for a hearing. Id., Rule 4.1. At that hearing, the magist.rate 
ascertains the accused's true name and address, and informs him of the 
charges against him, his right to counsel, his right to remain silent, and 
his right to a preliminary hearing if charged via complaint. Id., Rule 
4.2. Unless waived, the preliminary bearing must take place no later 
than 10 days after the defendant. is placed in cu,,fod~·- Id., Rule 5.1. 
The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether probable cause exists 
to hold the defendant for trial. ld., Rule 5.3. Against this background 
and in support of its position. the State relies on Moore v. Illinois. supra, 
where after recognizing tliat under 1llinois Ia.w Hthe prosecution in this 
case was commenced-wlien the victim's complaint was filed in court," 
we noted that "adversary ju<lical criminal proceedings" were initiated 
when the ensuing prelimina.ry hearing· occurred. Moore. supra, at 228. 
Compare United States v. DuvaJ,l, 537 F. 2d 15 (CAZ 1976) (the filing of 
a complaint and the issuance of an arrest warrant does not trigger the 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, that right accuring only 
upon further proceedings). The Arizona Supreme Court did not addreS3 
the Sixth Amendment question, nor do we. 
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custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to the putative 
defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the 
right to the presence of an attorney. Id., at 479. The Court 
also indicated the procedures to be followed subsequent to the 
warnings. If the accused indicates that he wishes to remain 
silent, "the interrogation must cease." If he requests coun-
sel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pres-
ent." 384 U. S., at 474. 
Miranda thus declared that an accused has a Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during 
custodial interrogation. Here, the critical facts as found by 
the Arizona Supreme Court are that Edwards asserted his 
right to counsel and his right to remain silent on January 19, 
but that the police, without furnishing him counsel, returned 
the next morning to confront him and as a result of the 
meeting secured incriminating oral admission. Contrary to 
the holdings of the state courts, Edwards insists that having 
exercised his right on the 19th to have counsel present dur-
ing interrogation, he did not validly waive that right on the 
20th. For the following reasons, we agree. 
First, the Arizona Supreme Court applied an erroneous 
standard for determining waiver where the accused has spe-
cificallyinvoked his right to counsel. It is reasonably clear 
under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be 
voluntary, but constitute a knowing and intelligent relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a 
matter which depends in each case "upon the particular facts 
and circumstances surrounding that .case,_ including the back-
ground, experience and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. 
Zerbst, supra, at 464; North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 
369, 374-375 (1978); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 404 
(1977); Fair v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 724-725 (1979). 
Considering the proceedings in the state courts in the light 
of this standard, we note that in denying petitioner's motion 
to suppress, the trial court found the admission to have been 
6 
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"voluntary," Jt. App. 3, 95, without separately focusing on 
whether Edwards had knowingly and intelligently relin-
quished his right to counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court, 
in a section of its opinion entitled "Volunta.riness of Waiver," 
stated that in Arizona confessions are prima facie involuntary 
and that the State had the burden of showing by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the confess:on was freely 
and voluntarily made. The court stated that the issue of 
voluntariness should be determined based on the totality of 
the circumstances as it related to whether an accused's action 
was "knowing and intelligent and whether his will was over-
borne." Once the trial court determines that "the confession 
is voluntary, the finding will not be upset on appeal absent 
clear and manifest error." Jt. App. 18-19. The cont then 
upheld the trial court's finding that the "waiver and con-
fession were voluntarily and knowingly made." Jt. App. 19. 
In referring to the necessity to find Edwards' confes-
sion knowing and intelligent, the State Supreme Court cited 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 226 ( 1973). Yet, 
it is clear that Schneckloth does not control the issue presented 
in this case. The issue in Schneckloth was under what con-
ditions an individual could be found to have consented to a 
search and thereby waive his Fourth Amendment rights. The 
Court declined to impose the "intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege" standard and re-
quired only that the consent be voluntary under the totality 
of the circumstances. The Court specifically noted that the 
right to counsel was a prime example of those rights requir-
ing the special protection of the knowing and intelligent 
waiver standard, id., at 242, but held that "The considerations 
that informed the Court's holding in Miranda are simply in-
applicable in the present case." 412 U. S., at 246. Schnec-
kloth itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent 
or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries. Here, how-
-Fu~f"~Y-
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eve1' sound the conclusion of the state courts as to the volun-
tariness of Edwards' admission may be, neither the trial court 
nor the Arizona Supreme Court undertook to focus on whether 
Edwards understood his right to counsel and intelligently and 
knowingly relinquished it. It is thus apparent that the deci-
sion below misunderstood the requirement for finding a valid 
waiver of the right to counsel, once invoked. 
Second, although we have held that after initially being 
advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself va-
lidly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, the Court 
has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are neces-
sary when the accused asks for counse1; and we now hold 
that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel s+oJ., A I 
present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that c.u 
right cannot be established by showin onl that he res onded . I,..,,._ /JJ 
~ police-initiated interrogat10nLJaffE~ 00l+¼e-2.~w advised of "-~ '(} 0..-S 
hi; rights.8 We further hold that an accused, si ch as Ed-
wards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police 
only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation 
by the authorities until counsel has been made available to 
him, unless the accused has bimself initiated further commu-
nication, exchanges or conversations with the police. 
Miranda itself indicated that the assertion of the right to 
counsel was a significant event and that once exercised by 
the accused, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney 
is present." 384 U. S., at 474. Our later cases have not 
~ In Brewer v. Williams, supra, where, as in Massiah v. United States, 
377 U. S. 201 (1963), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had accrued, 
the Court held that a valid waiver of counsel rights should not be inferred 
from the mere respon::;e by the a.ccused to overt or more subtle forms of 
in terrogation or other efforts to elict incriminating information. In 
M assiah and B rewer, counsel had been engaged or appointed and the 
admissions in question were elicited in his absence. But in McLeod v. 
Ohio, 381 U. S. 356 (1965), we summarily affirmed a deci::;ion that the 
police could not elicit information after indictment even t hough counsel 
had not yet been appointed . 
8 
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abandoned that view. In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 
(1975), the court noted that Miranda had distinguished be-
tween the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to 
remain silent and a request for an attorney and had required 
that interrogation cease until an attorney was present only 
if the individual stated that he wanted counsel. 423 U. S., 
at 104, n. 10; see also 423 U. S. , at 109-111 (WHITE, J., con-
curring). In Fair v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 710 (1979), 
the Court referred to Miranda's "rigid rule that an accused's 
request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights requiring that a11 interrogation cease." 
And just last Term, in a case where a suspect in custody had 
invoked his Miranda right to counsel, the Court again re-
ferred to the "undisputed right" under Miranda to remain 
silent and to be free of interrogation "until he had consulted 
with a lawyer." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 , 298 
(1980). We reconfirm these views and to lend them sub-
stance, emphasize that it is inconsistent with Miranda and 
its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinter-
rogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his 
right to counsel. 
In concluding that the fruits of the interrogation initiated 
by the police on January 20 could not be m:ed against Ed-
wards, we do not hold or imply that Edwards was powerless 
to countermand his election or that the authorities could in 
no event use any incriminating statements made by Edwards 
prior to his having access to counsel. Rad Edwards initiated 
the meeting on January 20, nothing in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments would prohibit the police from merely 
listening to his voluntary, volunteered statements and using 
them against him at the trial. The Fifth Amendment right 
identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at 
any custodial interrogation. Absent such interrogation, there 
would have been no infringement of the right that Edwards 
invoked and there would be no occasion to determine whether 
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there had been a valid waiver. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 
makes this sufficiently clear. 446 U. S., at 298, n. 2.9 
But this is not what the facts of this case show. Here, the 
officers conducting the interrogation on the evening of Jan-
uary 19 c.e'ased interrogation when Edwards requested coun-
sel as he had been advised. he had the right to do. The Ari-
zona Supreme Court was of the opiniofl that this was a suffi-
cient indisation of his Miranda rights, and we are in accord. 
--~• ~n=voco.:ho\'\ 
9 If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by 
the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the 
officers will say or do sometning that clearly would be "interrogation." 
In tha.t event, the question would.be whether a valid waiver of the right 
to counsel arid the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the 
purported waiver was -knowing and intelligent a1id found to be so under. 
the totalit,y of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the 
accused, not the police, reopened the ·dialogue with the authorities. 
Various decisions of the Court of Appeals are to the effect that a valid 
waiver of an accused's previously invoked Fifth Amendment right to coun-
8el is possible. · See, e. g., White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F. 2d 186, 191 (CA7 
1979) ("in certain instances, for various reasons, a person in custody who 
has pre,,iously requested counsel may· 'knowingly and voluntarily decide 
that he no longer wishes to be represented by counsel"), cert. pending 
No. 79-6601; Kennedy v. Fairman, 618·F : 2d 1242 (CA7 1980); United 
States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 ·F.- 2-d 482 (CA9) (en bane) (stating 
that it makes no sense to· hold that once an accused has requested counsel, 
"prisoner may never; until he 'has actually talked with counsel, change 
his mind and decide to spea'k with ·t11e police without an attorney being 
present"). cert. denied, 436 U. S. 919 (19178). See generally Cobbs v. 
Robinson, 528 F . 2d 1331, 1342 (CA2- 1975'); United States v. Grcmt, 549 
F . 2d 942 (CA4 1977), vacated on other grounds sub 1wm. Whitehead v. 
United States, 435 U. S. !HZ (1978); United States v. Hart, 619 F. 2d 
325 (CA4 1980) ; United States v. Hauck, 586 F. 2d 1296 (CA8 1978). 
The rule in the Fifth Circuit is that a knowing and intelligent waiver 
cannot be fouI)d once the Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been 
clearly invoked unless the accused initiates the renewed conta.ct. See, 
e. g., United States v. Massey, 550 F. 2d 300 (CA5 1977); United States 
v. Priest, 409 F . 2d 491 (CA5 1969) . Waiver is possible, however, when 
the request for counsel is equivocal. Nash v. Estelle, 597 F . 2d 513'· 
(CA5 1979) (eri bane). See Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F . 2d 7-68' 
rfCAo 197.9'), 
~ 
Cu~ foch o. I 
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It is also clear that without making counsel available to Ed-
wards, the police returned to him the next day. This was 
not at his suggestion or request. Indeed, Edwards informed 
the detention officer that he did not want to talk to anyone. 
At the meeting, the detectives told Edwards that they wanted 
to talk to him and again advised him of his Miranda rights. 
Edwards stated that he would talk, but what prompted this 
action does not appear. He listened at his own request to 
part of the taped statement made by one of his alleged ac-
complices and then made an incriminating statement, which 
was used against him at his trial. We think it is clear that 
Edwards was subjected to l interrogation on January 20 and 
that this occurred at the instance of the authorities. His 
statement, made without having had access to counsel, did 
not amount to a valid waiver and hence was inadmissible.10 
Accordingly, the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court 
that Edwards had waived his right to counsel was infirm and 
the judgment of that court is reversed. 
So ordered. 
10 We need not decide whether there would. have been a valid issue of 
counsel had the events of January 20 been the firnt and only interrogation 
to which Edwards hacl been :ii l!gg1;mtea . Cf. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 
U .. S .. 309. (197.8),. S ohJ ~c.t(. J 
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Dear Byron: 
As you might suppose in light of my previous letter 
of December 31st concerning this case , I share the 
concerns raised by Lewis . I shall await his writing 
before coming to rest . 
Mr . Justice White 
Copes to the Conference 
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Dear Byron: 
Your recirculation of March 20 still troubles me, 
as it seems to enunciate a~ se rule: ' 
"We further hold that an accused, such as 
Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal 
with the police only through counsel, is not 
subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused has 
himself initiated further communication, or 
exchanges or conversations with the police." 
p. 7. (Emphasis added.) 
The requirement that the accused must "himself 
initiate" a further meeting with the authorities, is 
reiterated on page 8, and again on page 10. There, as one 
of the reasons for reversal, your opinion states that the 
discussion at issue "was not at [petitioner's] suggestion or 
request". 
I agree that a waiver of counsel, to be effective 
in this context, must be made "knowingly and intelligently" 
as well as voluntarily. That is, the accused must fully 
understand his right to counsel. But surely a waiver may 
meet these requirements in some circumstances where the 
accused himself did not "initiate" the further conversation. 
For example, there ~ould be a perfectly innocent 
conversation initiated by a jailer (or someone else in 
authority) with the person in custody that could evolve into 
a confession, knowingly and intelligently made. 
,.,.,, ...... .,, 
- - 2. 
Putting it differently, your opinion - as I read 
it - would require a court to find on a motion to suppress, 
or a jury to be instructed at a trial, that waiver of 
counsel can be effective only if the "communication, 
exchange or conversation" was affirmatively "initiated" by 
the accused. No prior case has so held, and I see no reason 
to extend Miranda beyond its present boundaries. Whether 
there has been a valid waiver is an issue of fact that 
should be determined in light of the circumstances of the 
case, provided the standard is~ as you state - that it must 
be made knowingly and intelligently as well as voluntarily. 
For the reasons stated in my letter to you of 
December 29, I will join the judgment, but will write 
separately if your present draft commands a Court. After 
four months, I am genuinely regretful not to be able to join 
you. f 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White i~ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. 79-5269 
Robert Edwards, Petitioner,] 0 W . f C . . h n nt o ert10ran to t e 
S f
v.A . Supreme Court of Arizona. 
tate o nzona. 
[January -, 1981] 
JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari in this case, 446 U. S. -, limited to 
'question one presented in the petition, which in relevant part 
was "whether the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
'requires suppression of a post~arrest confession, which was 
'obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to consult 
'counsel before further interrogation; " 
I 
On January 19, 1976, a sworn complaint was filed against 
Edwards in Arizona state court charging him with ,robbery, 
burglary, and first-degree inurder.1 An arrest warrant was 
issued pursuant to the compiaint, and Edwards was arrested 
at his home later that same day. At the police station, he 
was informed of his tights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 
"394 U. S. 436 (1966). ·Petitioner stated 'that he understooa 
his rights, and was wiiiing to submit to questioning. After 
being toid that another suspect already in custody had impli-
cated him in the crime, Edwards denied involvement and 
gave a taped statement presenting an alibi defense. He then 
sought to "make a deal." The interrogating officer told him 
that he wanted a statement, but that he did not have the 
1 The facts stated in text are for the most part taken from the opinion 
'of th!:l Supreme Court of Arizona, 
2 
79-5269-0PINION 
EDWARDS v. ARIZONA 
authority to negotiate a deal. The officer provided Edwards 
with the number of a county attorney. Petitioner made the 
call, but hung up after a few ,moments. Edwards then sa:d, 
"I want an attorney, before making a deai." · At that point, 
questioning ceased and Edwards was taken to ·county' jail. 
At 9: 15 the next morning, two detectives, colleagues of 
the officer who had interrogated Edwards the previous night, 
came to · the jail and. asked to see 'Edwards. · When the de-
tention offi~er informed Edwa~ds that the detectives wished 
to speak with him., h~ replied that he· did not want to talk to 
anyone. The guard told him that "he had" to talk and then 
\ took him to meet with the 'detectives. ·-The officers ident:fied 
themselves, stated they wantea to falk to him, arid informed 
, ·.him of his Miranda' rights. ''Edwards was willing to talk, but 
he first wanted to hear the tapea statement of the alleged 
accomplice who had implicated him.2 After · listening to the 
·' tape for several minutes, petitioner said that he would make 
a statement so long as it was not tape Tecofded. · The de-
. tectives informed him· that the--recording was irrelevant since 
they could testify in court concerning whatever he said. Ed-
wards repliea "I'll tell you anything you ·want to ·know, but 
I don't want it on tape:-'' 'He thereupon implicated himself 
in the crime. 
Prior to trial, Edwards moved to suppress his confession 
'·on the ground that his Miranda ·rights had been violated 
when the officers returned to question 11im after he had in-
voked his right to counsel. The tria1 court initially granted 
the motion to suppress,3 but reversed its ruling when pre-
sented with a supposedly controlling deds:on of a higher Ari-
2 It appears from the record that the detectives had brought the tape 
·recording with them. 
3 The trial judge emphasized that the detectives had met with Edwards 
on January 20, without being requested by Edwards to do so and con-
cluded that they had ignored his request for counsel made the previ01lllS 
evening App. 91-93.. 
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zona court! The court stated without explanation that it 
found Edwards' statement to be voluntary. Edwards was 
tried twice and convicted.5 Evidence concerning his con-
fession was admitted at both trials. 
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Edwards 
had invoked both his right to rema:n silent and his right to 
counsel during the interrogation conducted on the night of 
January 19.6 The court then went on to determine, however, 
that Edwards had waived both rights during the January 20 
meeting when he voluntarily gave his statement to the de-
tectives after again being informed that he need not answer 
questions and that he need not answer w:thout the advice of 
counsel : "The trial court's finding that the waiver and con-
fession were voluntarily and knowingly made is upheld." 
Because the use of Edward's confession against him at his 
trial violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as construed in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, we 
reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court. 7 
4 The case was State v. Travis , 26 Ariz. App. 24, 545 P. 2d 986 (1976) . 
5 The jury in the first trial was unable to reach a verdict. 
6 This issue was disputed by the State. The court, while finding that the 
question was arguable, held that Edwards' request for an attorney to 
assist him in negotiating a deal was "sufficiently clear" within the context 
of the interrogation that it "must be interpreted as a request for counsel 
and as a request to remain silent until counsel was present." 
7 We thus need not decide Edwards' claim that the State depfr: ed him of 
his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as con-
strued and applied in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964) . In 
that case, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises 
whenever an accused has been indicted or adversary criminal proceedings 
have otherwise begun and that this right is violated when admissiors are 
subsequently elicited from the accused in the absence of counsel. While 
initially conceding in its opening brief on the merits that Edwards ' right 
to counsel under Massiah attached immediately after he was formally 
charged, the State in its supplemental brief and during oral argument took 
the position that under Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1976) , and 
ij 
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II 
In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the Court determined that 
the Fifth anq Foll.rteenth Amendment's prohibition against 
compelled self-incrimination required that custodial inter-
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220, 226-227 (1977), the filing of the formal 
complaint did not constitute the "adversary judicial criminal proceedings" 
necessary to trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under the 
state constitution, "No person shall be prosecuted criminally in any court 
of record for felony or misdemeanor, otherwise than by information or 
indictment; no person shall be prosecuted for felony by information with-
out having had a preliminary examination before a magistrate or having 
waived such preliminary examination." Ariz. Const., Art. 2, § 30. Tiie 
State contends that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach 
until either the constitutionally required indictment or information is filed · 
or at least no earlier than the preliminary hearing to which a defendant 
is entitled if the matter proceeds by complaint. Under Arizona law, a 
felony prosecution may be commenced by way of a complaint, 17 Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 2.2. The complaint 
is a "written statement of the essential facts constituting a public offense, 
made upon oath before a magistrate," id., Rule 2.3, upon which the 
magistrate eithet issues an arrest warrant or dismisses the complaint. 
Id., Rule 2.4. Once arrested, the accused must be taken before the 
magistrate for a hearing. Id., Rule 4.1. At that hearing, the magist,rate 
ascertains the accused's true name and address, and informs him of the 
charges against him, his right to counsel, his right to remain silent, and 
his right to a preliminary 1iearing if charged via complaint. Id. , Rule 
4.2. Unless waived, the preliminary hearing must take place no later 
than 10 da.ys after the defendant is placed in custody. Id., Rule 5.1. 
The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether probable cause exists 
to hold the defendant for trial. Id., Rule 5.3. Against this background 
and in support of its position, the State relies on Moore v. Illinois, supra, 
where after recognizing that under Illinois law "the prosecution in this 
case was commenced ... when the victim's complaint was filed in court," 
we noted that "adversary judical criminal proceedings" were initiated 
when the ensuing preliminary hearing occurred. Moore, supra, at 228. 
Compare United States v. Duval,l, 537 F. 2d 15 (CA2 1976) (the filing of 
a, complaint and t.he issuance of an arrest warrant does not trigger the 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, tha.t right a.ccruing only 
upon farther proceedings). The Arizona Supreme Court did not address 
the Si--gth Atnenc'.b:nent i:iuestion, nor d.o we. 
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rogation be preceded by advice to the putative defendant that 
he has the right to remain silent and also the right to the 
presence of an attorney. Id., at 479. The Court also indi-
cated the procedures to be followed subsequent to the warn~ 
ings. If the accused indicates that he wishes to remain 
silent, "the interrogation must cease." If he requests coun-
sel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pres-
ent." 384 U. S., at 474. 
Miranda thus declared that an accused has a Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to have com;1sel present during 
custodial interrogation. Here, the critical facts as found by 
the Arizona Supreme Court are that "Edwards asserted his 
right to counsel and his right to remain silent on January 19, 
but that the police, without furnishing him counsel, returned 
ihe next morning to confront 'him and as a result of the 
meeting secured incriminating oral admissions. Contrary to 
the holdings of the state courts, 'Edwards insists that having 
exercised his right on the 19th to have counsel present dur-
ing interrogation, he did not va1idly waive that right on the 
20th. For the following reasons, we agree. 
First, the Arizona Supreme Court applied an erroneous 
standard for determining waiver wher~ he accused has spe- /j 
cifically invoked his right to counsel#" It is reasonably clear 
under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be 
voluntary, but constitute a knowing and intelligent relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a 
matter which depends in each case "upon the particular facts 
and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-
ground, experience and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. 
Zerbst, supra, at 464; Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 
835 (1975); North Carolina v. B1,1,tler, 441 U. S. 369, 374-375 
(1978); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare 
v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 724-725 (1979) ~ 
Considering the proceedings in the state courts in the light 
of this standard, we note that in denying petitioner's motion 
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"voluntary," Jt. App. 3, 95, without separately focusing on 
whether Edwards had · knowingly and intelligently relin-
quished his right to counsel. _ The Arizona Supreme Court, 
'in a section of its opinion entitl~d "Voluntariness of Waiver," 
stated that in Arizona confessi~ns are prima facie involuntary 
·and that the State had the burden -of showing by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence ,that the confess:on was freely 
and voluntarily made. The court stated that the issue of 
voluntariness should be determined based on the totality of 
'the circumstances as it related to whether an accused's-action 
was "knowing and intelligent and whether his will was over-
borne." Once,the trial .court determines that "the confession 
is voluntary, th~ finding will ~ot be upset on appeal absent 
clear and manifest-error." Jt: App. 18-19: The cont then 
upheld the trial court's finding that the "waiver and con-
fession were volunt~rily and knowingly made.n Jt. App. 19. 
In referring to the necessity to ·find - Edwards' . confes-
sion knowing and i~telligent, the State Supreme Court cited 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 226 (1973). Yet, 
it is clear that Schne-ckloth does not control the issue presented 
in this case. The issue in Schneckloth was under what con-
ditions an individual could be found to have consented to a 
search and thereby waive his Fourth Amendment rights. - The 
'Court declined to impose the ·"intentiohal -relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege" standard and re-
·quired only that the consent be voluntary under the totality 
-of the circumstances. · The Court specifically noted that the 
right to counsel was a prime example of those· rights requir-
ing the special protection of the knowing ahd intelligent 
waiver standard, id., at 242, but held that "[t]he consider.a-
tions that informed the Court's holding in Miranda are sim-
ply inapplicable in the present case·." 412 U. S., at 246. 
Schneckloth itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of 
a. consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing 
and intelligent waiver (On the ,other, are discrete inquiries. 
o/9-5269-0PINION 
EDWARDS v. ARIZONA 1 
Here, however sound the conclusion of the state courts as to 
the voluntariness of Edwards' admission may be, neither the 
trial court nor the Arizona Supreme Court undertook to focus 
on whether Edwards understood his right to counsel and 
intelligently and knowing1y relinquished it. It is thus ap-
parent that the decision be1ow misundertood the requirement 
for finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel, once 
invoked. 
Second, although we have held that after initially being 
advised of his Mirand,a rights, the accused may himself va-
lidly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North 
Carolina v. Butler, supra, at 372-376, the Court has strongly 
indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the 
accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an ac-
cused has invoked his right to have counsel present during 
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot 
be established by showing only that he responded to further 
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been 
advised of his rights. We further o a an accused, sue 
as war s, avmg expressed his desire to deal with the 
police only through counsel, is not subject to further jnter-
rogation by the authorities until counsel has been ma.de avail-
able to him, unless the accused has himself ·nitiated further 
communicatio~ changes or conversa:...:t..:..;io;.;.n:;.::_..;.;.,:_::.::.:....... 
ranaa 1tse1t mct1catect tnat tne assertion of the nght to 
counsel was a significant event and that once exercised by 
8 In Brewei· v. Williams, supra, where, as in Massiah v. United States, 
377 U. S. 201 (1963), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had accrued, 
the Court held that a valid waiver of counsel rights should not be inferred 
from the mere response by the accused to overt or more subtle fonns of 
interrogation or other efforts to elict incriminating information. In 
Massiah and Brewer, counsel had been engaged or appointed and the 
admissions in question were elicited in his absence. But in McLeod v. 
Ohio, 381 U. S. 356 ( 1965), we summarily affirmed a decision that the 
police could not elicit information after indictment even though counsel 
had u.ot yet been appointed, 
s 
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the accused, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney 
is present." 384 U. S., at. 474. Our later cases have not 
abandoned that view. In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 
(1975) , the Court noted that Miranda has distinguished be-
tween the procedural safeguards triggere·d by a request to 
remain silent and a request for an attorney and had required 
that interrogation cease until an attorney was present only 
if the individual stated that he wanted counsel. 423 U. S., 
at 104, n. 10 ; see also 423 'U. S., at 109-111 (WHITE, J ., 
concurring) . In Fare v. Michael C., supra, at 710 (1979), 
the Court referred to Miranda's "rigid rule that an accused's 
request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth 
.Amendment rights ·requiring that all interrogation cease." 
And just last Term, in a case where a suspect in custody had 
invoked his Miranda :right to counsel, the Court again re-
ferred to the "undisputed right" under Miranda to remain 
silent and to be free of interrogation "until he had consulted 
with a lawyer." Rhode Island v. Innis, 44.6 U. S. 291, 298 
(1980) . We reconfirm these views and to lend them sub-
. stance, emphasize that it is inconsistent with Miranda and ( 
its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reintBr- , 
rogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his 
right to counsel. 
In concluding that the fruits of the interrogation initiated 
by the police on January 20 could not be used against Ed-
wards, we do not hold or imply that Edwards was powerless 
to countermand his election or that the authorities could in 
79-5269-OPINION 
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would have been no infringement of the right that Edwards 
invoked and there would be no occasion to determine whether 
there had been a valid waiver. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 
makes this sufficiently cleat. 446 U. S., at 298, n. 2.9 
But this is not what the facts of this case show. Here, the 
officers conducting the interrogation on the evening of Jan-
uary 19 ceased interrogation when Edwards requested coun-
sel as he. had been advised he had the right to do. The Ari-
- 9 If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by 
the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the 
officers will say or do something that clearly would be "interrogation.'' 
In that event, the question would be whether a valid waiver of the right 
to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the 
purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under 
the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the 
accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authori!l 
Various dec1s10ns of the Courts of Appeals are to the effect thau y:a'' i 
waiver or an accused's previously invoked Fifth Amendment nght to coun-
sel is possible. See, e. g., White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F. 2d 186, 191 (CA7 
1979) ("in certain instances, for various reasons, a person in custody who 
has previously requested counsel may knowingly and voluntarily decide 
that he no longer wishes to be represented by counsel"), cert. pending 
No. 79-6601; Kennedy v. Fairman, 618 F. 2d 1242 (CA7 1980); United 
States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F. 2d 482 (CA9) (en bane) (stating 
that it makes no sense to hold that once an accused has requested counsel, 
"[he] may never, until he has actually talked with counsel, change his 
mind and decide to speak with the police without an attorney being pres-
ent") , cert . denied, 436 U. S. 919 (1978). See generally Cobbs v. 
Robinson, 528 F. 2d 1331, 1342 (CAZ 1975); United States v. Grant, 549 
F . 2d 942 (CA4 1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Whitehead v. 
United States, 435 U. S. 912 (1978); United States v. Hart, 619 F. 2d 
325 (CA4 1980) ; United States v. Hauck, 586 F. 2d 1296 (CA8 1978) . 
The rule in the Fifth Circuit is that a knowing and intelligent waiver 
cannot be found once the Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been 
clearly invoked unless the accused initiates the renewed contact. See, 
e. g., United States v. Massey, 550 F. 2d 300 (CA5 1977); United States 
v. Priest, 409 F. 2d 491 (CA5 1969). Waiver is possible, however, when 
the request for counsel is equivocal. Nash v. Estelle, 597 F. 2d 513' 
(CA5 1979) (en bane). See Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F. 2d 768" 
, (CA5 ~1979),. 
10 
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zona Supreme Court was of the opinion that this was a suffi-
cient invocation of his Miranda rights, and we are in accord. 
It is also clear that without making counsel available to Ed-
wards, the police returned to him the next day. This was 
not at his suggestion or request. Indeed, Edwards informed 
the detention officer that he did not want to talk to anyone. 
At the meeting, the detectives told Edwards that they wanted 
to talk to him and again advised him of his Miranda rights. 
Edwards stated that he would tal~, but what prompted this 
action does not appear. He listened at his own request to 
part of the taped stateme11-t made by one of his alleged ac-
complices and then made an incriminating statement, which 
was used against him at hjs trial. We think it is clear that 
Edwards was subjected to custodial interrogation on January 
20 within the meaning of Rhode I sl,and v. Innis, supra, and 
that this occurred at the instance of the authorities. His 
statement, made without having had access to counsel, did 
not amount to a valid waiver and hence was inadmissible.10 
Accordingly, the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court 
that Edwards had waived his right to counsel was infirm and 
the judgment of that court is reversed. 
So ordered. 
10 We need not decide whether there would have been a valid waiver of 
counsel had the events of January 20 been the first and only interrogation 
to which Edwards had been subjected. Cf. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 
U; S~ 3091 (1978). 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court. Petitioner 
~ 
here invoked his right to counsel, and Miranda v. Arizona, 
U.S. (1966), makes clear that the police could not 
~ ~ eti tioner from his cell against his will to fl .. ,,f • -1~ ' 
~ ,, __ - -- ''t.-
1 
renew the interrogation. The constitutional touchstone, 
\J { cl 
as the Court ' opinion 
f-. 
states, is er -=the 9:USf>eCt 
"initiated" the additional interrogation. Ante, at 8. 
I write separately only to emphasize that a 
statement that emerges from incidental contact between the 
authorities and an incarcerated suspect is not 






initially approached the suspect. Jail and police 
officials in the course of their work necessarily deal 
with suspects under detention. ' Attendants as part of 
their duties bring food to prisoners in cells, and guards 25 
~
ef;J,l,~~ 
supervise periods of recreation. 
. ,: · ,.,, .... r-.tc.J /1.fl#rMJ-.._ c:.t,-<.~ -"'4t, 
~ , cthe police \~yJ 
a,,t.e_ ~-?~~·iJ~ p,.,~~ ~ ,r e2P ~ ~,vW-~ ' .,ll \_ ,,..,.J 
JDav Revv- wc.s:::ica Lu- itt~ whether he has 
changed his mind about 
1 /· 1 pL-1' I\ . "'-/ ~,r, .fr 
attorney. I\ Statements by 
. ' j ~ 'YV\,~ ~ ....ti \_ ' I "'-'::! '"\,;) --1 
speaking to them without an 
,f'l , 
t- • ___ 1.,.,, ,,;i'-" t. {yJ .A!.... 1; ___ d .wvv 
the- suspect that emerge from 
1·1-, 
e-Pco•mte-rs st:teA as these are- n 
/j-'-~.,, , :J- ,lv-0-:U.,\.,y~ ... ~- ,,., -J. . ~ 
/v'-++- ' . . . 
unconst~tut1onally obta1ne'tl'. ,, 
-f".-(';""';,.{ 
~~ .. deLe.n 
reconsideration, may k'Rowi;ngly ~tu1Lta1ew. 
counsel and J I al -.;, submit to questioning ~ 
:.,,,-+ 
upon 
y • waive 
~t - ease,-a1. Ehough ~ ou'1.cr-71av commence the 
'. t:.~~ 
j --?'. •· 
I tM. \ a.~ ,le, 
/ V ,.1 / t "U) ..,V,.1-




onversation with .. the suspect, the suspect would have ~--= 35 
C}ii:i~ted the . inte"Tr.ogation with his waive--r of counsel. 
J_0 frf· J-~ 4 rt-,M l\,L~ 
our rule is that police cannot themselves r:.enew tho. 
interrogation. Nothing we · hold today suggests that police 40 
t I ,,, ' .. - .__,. ~ L ., ; ~ 
I "\, " _..., I 
" {) 
may not ..i&i:-tj-Ett-e=--, a conve-rsat:i.on ~ ith the suspect to 
t.' -~• '\IV ( &., ,._, -~ l t. 0 V T 1. J (' l' ~ J... ~ 
as.-.ertaift whet-n~.r-h-e ~b::as c~s mind. 
In -JJ6 
~~ 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In joining e opinion of the Court as I do, I 
of i 
we reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme 
Court because it applied an erroneous standard for 
determining whether petitioner had waived his right to 
counsel, having previously invoked it. The Court today 
repeats the correct test or standard: 
"[W]aivers of counsel must not only be 
voluntary, but constitute a knowing and 
intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of 
a known right or privilege ••• " Ante, at 5. 
Moreover, it is settled law that whether this standard has 
been met depends in each case "upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case". Johnson v. Zerbst, 
2. 
u. s. , at 464, see ante, at 5. In a word, the 
question turns on the familiar one of voluntariness. But 
for a waiver of a constitutional right to be voluntary, the 
actor must understand the right and wish to relinquish it.* 
*In M1ch1gan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), the question was 
whether after a suspect had invoked his right to remain 
silent, his confession in a subsequent interrogation was 
voluntarily made. The facts differ somewhat from this case 
since there had been no request for counsel. In principle, 
however, the question whether there was a subsequent 
voluntary waiver is the same. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing 
for the Court said: 
" ••• a blanket prohibition against the taking of 
voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from 
further interrogation, regardless of the 
circumstances, would transform the Miranda 
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to 
legitimate police investigative activity, and 
deprive suspects of an opportunity to make 
informed and intelligent assessments of their 
------J ~t~rests. \ Clearly, therefore, neither this~ 
--.::::;: passage nor any other passage in the Miranda 
opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se 
proscription of indefinite duration upon any 
further questioning by any police officer on any 
subject, once the person in custody has indicated 





In determining in this case whether Edwards' 
incriminating statement was voluntarily made, a highly 
relevant fact was whether he initiated the conversation in 
question. He had been given appropriate Miranda warnings, 
and after receiving these had indicated his desire for a 
lawyer. It was clear, therefore, that he knew and 
understood his right to counsel as well as his right to 
remain silent. The controlling fact, however, is that 
(
__, 0-v 
BewarGS was C ·1 ~ taken from his cell against his will 
for the purpose of renewing interrogatio~ This coercion 
creates the reasonable doubt as to whether his confession 
3. 
was voluntary in the sense that our cases use that term. I 
agree with the Court that the judgment below should be 
reversed because of this unlawful conduct by the police. 
The Court's opinion emphasizes that the police, 
rather than Edwards, initiated the further conversation -
J-.-~ 
__ . / I ,1 rr ,; 
and lwnat constitutes initia tion of ~ . 
tL. f -{· .,. l..\...-t. ½. /l~ NA!~ J) { 
·•~bd.:( .. 
.\J' 
' • . • . /')/4-<,,,:J:.~ .,,/ C 
'w~h~.v:-l' ~ L~,1,/'-f.'1),,_ -,... 
IJ..r-, to l--
~V\.c~~-· 4. 
-conve-r-sa-t:i-en --or-commun icati:urr -wit1rpoi."i-ee fol lowing Mir and a 
~
warnings and a request for counsel, e£ 00-l:lrse, is a question 
"' ~ 
of fact to be ~et~rmined jn_J ,.i,ght Qf th_e ci~cum.stances ~ ~ 
------ -- . ~J 
mav occu f:..:F i!@>r ex-mn~ ~ in tl::le cor:ite~t of any routine 
discussion between an accused with a guard or an officer 
V6-lc.uc.~, "1 ~/ ~-k ~ 
that commenced about wholly unrelated matters i\ ~or is rt ~ 
'/{ J-1 LA-~ • 
/\unusual for a person in custody, who previously expressed an 
unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a lawyer, to 
change his mind and even welcome an opportunity to talk~ 
Th~s, in some circumstances, it is clear that police ar-e' not 
/ 
,,/' 
precluded from inquiring whether an accused, upon further 
reflection or in light of some new development, th~::ereed• 
would like to talk: 
I 
"Although a recently arrested individual may 
have indicated an initial desire not to 
answer questions, he would nonetheless want 
to know immediately--if it were true--that 
his ability to explain a particular 
incriminating fact or to supply an alibi for 
a particular time period would result in his 
immediate release. Similarly, he might wish 
to know--if it were true--that (1) the case 
against him was unusually strong and that (2) 
his immediate cooperation with the 
authorities in the apprehension and 
conv ~ ion of others or in the rec<?.,Y.e..~¥- of 
propert~ ould redound to hi§...~it in the 
form of a reatteed....~h~ Michi~an v. 
Mosley, 423 g_~,s...-gr,;;;-10'9-n-.. -:-l (Wh1 te, J., 
conc~--r'n the result.} ... ~ 
As -"; · Justice White observed, this Court consistently 
5. 
has"rejected any parternalistic rule protecting a defendant 
from his intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own 
criminal case." Id.' at 109. J/ 
On the basis of the foregoing understanding of the 
Court's decision today, I join its opinion. 
..., 
"'\) <:,t 
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the result. 
Although I agree that the judgment of the Arizona Su-
-- --, -p=_r_e_m_e_ C....;o"""u-it\ be reversedf,i!S'I do not join the Court's opinion 
because I am not sure what it means. 
;;:t, I can agree with much of the opinion. It state( ante, at 
~ the settled rule: 
____./ - - ~"It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of 
counsel must not only be voluntary, but constitute a 
knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in 
each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case, including the background, experi-
ence and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938); Faretta v. California, 422 
U. S. 806, 836 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 
U. S. 369, 374-375 (1978); Brewer v. Williams, 430 
1 As the Court's decision today demonstrates, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U. S. 438 (1966), continues to have the force of binding precedent even 
though (as JUSTICE WHITE made clear in his dissent in Miranda) the 
additional burden imposed on effective law enforcement is neither insub-
stantial nor manifestly required by anything in the Constitution. Id. , at 
526 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Nor is Miranda the only safeguard for 
individuals accused of crime. Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 
(1964), also confers a right to counsel-one more clearly based on the 
Constitution. Though the Massiah right is independent of the Miranda 
right, they overlap under some circumstances. Together they afford a 
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U. S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 
724-724 (1979)." 
I have thought it settled law, as these cases tell us, that one 
accused of crime may waive any of the constitutional safe-
guards-including the right to remain silent, to jury trial, to 
call witnesses, to cross-examine one's accusers, to testify in 
one's own behalf, and-of course-to have counsel. What-
ever the right, the standard for waiver is whether the actor 
fully understands the right in question and voluntarily in-
tends to relinquish it. 
In its opinion today, however, the Court-after reiterating 
the familiar principles of waiver-goes on to say: 
"We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, hav-
ing expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation 
by the authorities until counsel has been made available 
to him, unless the accused has himself initiated further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
police." Ante, at 7 (emphasis added). 
In view of the emphasis placed on "initiation," see also id., 
1 at 8, 9, n. 9, I find the Court's opinionRoee ole~r ;iHMl I ,, ottHt 
\ OHf!lOOt £row tho f!lOP a£ IusrnH1t1 'Qhnlill. M ~l.e Of'il:'l,ol:'l is 
read to create a new per se rule, requiring a threshold inquiry 
~ precisely who opened any conversation between an ac-
cused and state officials, I cannot agree. I would not super-
impose a new element of proof on the established doctrine of 
wajver of counsel. 
Perhaps the Court's opinion can be read as not departing 
from established doctrine. Accepting the formulation quoted 
~ ove, two questions are identifiable: (i) was there in fact 
"interrogation," and (ii) did the police "initiate" it. Each 
of these qu ions is, of course, relevant to the admissibility 
of a co ession. In this case, for example, it is clear that 
Edwa.r s was taken from his cell against his will and sub-
jecte to renewed interrogation. Whether this is described 
A"-"~ a..-t 5 _ , . 
~-'°f 
se..<L 
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I 
. as police-"initiate~" ~nterrogation_ or in some ~ther way, it -\- " 
clearly was quest10nmg under circumstances mcomp~ \ 
~ h a voluntary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel. 
But few cases will be as clear as this one. Communica-
tions between police and a suspect in custody are common-
place. It is useful to contrast the circumstances of this case 
with typical, and permissible, custodial communications be-
tween police and a suspect who has asked for counsel. For 
example. police do not impermissibly "initiate" renewed in-
terrogation by engaging in routine conversations with sus-
pects about unrelated matters. And police legitimately mey 
inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind about speak-
ing to them without an attorney. E. g. , State v. Turner, 
32 Ore. App. 61 , 573 P. 2d 326 (1978); see State v. Crisler, 
- Minn. -. - , 285 N. W. 2d 679. 6~2 (1979): State v. 
Marcum, 21 Wash. App. 975. - , 601 P. 2d 975, 978 (1979). 
It is not unusual for a person in custody who previously has 
expressed an unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a 
lawyer. to r.hange his mind and even welcome an opportunity 
to talk. Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that 
preclude police from ascertaining whether a SllsPect has re-
considerPd his original decision. As JusTICE WHITE has ob-
served. this Court consistently has "rejected any paternalistic 
rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent irnd volun-
tarv decisionR about his own criminal case." Michiaan v. 
· 423 U. S. 96, 109 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in ..!../ 
-----"IP 2 horo pro of course cirsumotsr cag in znbi cb e orimireJ mwnsct zube ~ J ) T'"' 
iMii!iaU5 Jaos :0£11008 to er;cuk eeith the iJO]lte 1afio11aU.9 ntight cba1 gc Lis 
MiH@I Ac JusTICE WHITE noted in Michigan v. Mosley: 
"Although a recently arrested individual may have indicated an initial 
desire not to answer questions , he would nonethrless want to know imme-
diately-if it were true-that his ability to explain a parfrular incrimi-
nating fact or to supply an alibi for a particulilr time period would re-
sult in his immediate release. Similarly, he might wish to know-if it 
were true-that (1) the case against him was unusually strong and that 
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In sum, once warnings have been give 
counsel has been invoked, the relevan~ ~ton 
suspect now desires to talk to police without counsel-is a 
question of fact to be determined in light of all of the cir-
cumstances. Who "initiated" a conversation may be rele-
vant to the question of waiver, but it is not the sine qua non 
to the inquiry. The ultimate question is whether there was 
e, free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation 
commenced. 
P-L~fj-
(2) his immediate cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension 
and conviction of others or in the recovery of property would redound to 
his benefit in the form of a reduced charge." 423 U. S. 96, 109, n. 1 
(1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in result). 
In Michigan v. Mosley, of course, the question was whether a suspect 
who had invoked his right to remain silent later could change his mind and 
speak to police. The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the present 
case because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is nevertheless 
true in both cases that 
"a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a 
permanent immunjty from further interrogation, regardless of the cir-
cumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irra.tional 
obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects 
of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their 






If the Court's opinion does nothing more than 
restate these principles, I am in agreement with it. I 
hesitate to join the opinion only because of what appears to 
be an undue, and undefined, emphasis on a single element: 
"initiation." As JUSTICE WHITE has noted, the Court in 
Miranda v. Arizona in effect "constitutionalized" a A~ 
prophylactic rule that is not manifestly required by 
anything in the text of the Constitution. 384 u.s.
1 
at 526 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). l!J Miranda itself recognized, 
however, that counsel's assistance can be waived. Id., at 





evaluated under theAZerbst standard quoted above~ ~:fFe,ScarL ~ - - ~ ---E;S aokre,day ~ b I i r,Jid: 
~ '-v~~ z+,b:z!::H;o'W-'n al i 
iver 
Pj ~ ~ 
) 
lfp/ss 4/4/81 Rider X (Edwards) 
@ My concern is that the Court's opinion today may be read as 
'-.,/
,, ✓1' C '2,..1 \ -~r ·--1' 
constitutionalizing 0 not ·-generalized
1
standara )Ut a 
-' ~ 
among ivar ious facts that ~ay be 
\.__ _I h~ Q.,, -~£•·-- ., • ._, r,J. ... A ) 
whether r waiver0 ◄-~ 
single element of fact 
~ 
relevant t,,t ldetermining 
·S tf Ill~'. \___ ~ 
~ . . .. IJ 
C} ~· ~
~/ Such a step - - "' be taken only if it i s)" 
<?leafrf th~t the htradi ~ional. d. . stan~ardh~¾ i m." ids f ~ 
1ne ect1ve. T ere 1s no 1n 1cat1on, 1n t e mult1tu e o 
cases that come to us each Term, that Zerbst and its progeny 
have failed to protect constitutional rights. 
pwc 04/10/81 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and write 
separately only to emphasize that a criminal suspect who 
has asked for counsel subsequently may change his mind and 
submit to questioning. 10 
When a suspect requests counsel, interrogation 
of course must cease. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 438, 
474 (1966). If, however, the suspect later demonstrates 
that he has reconsidered and wishes to proceed without 
counsel, cf. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 15 
(1979), subsequent voluntary statements are not 
necessarily obtained in violation of the Constitution. 
The touchstone, as the Court's opinion states, is whether 
the suspect "initiated" the additional interrogation. 
Ante, at 7, 8, 9, n. 9. This petitioner plainly did not; 20 
he was taken from his cell against his will. 
2. 
It is useful to contrast the circumstances of 
this case with typical, 
~ f ,.6 O-J.r-1)) ,, t' (.,,~ ('; . .;, 
and permissible, custodial 
r, ' - c/2..--:-
communications ~ 1a suspectr For example, police do not 
~·~~) 
1 





conversations with suspects about unrelated matters. And 
police legitimately may inquire whether a suspect has 
changed his mind about speaking to them without an 
attorney. ~, State v. Turner, 32 Or. App. 61, 573 P.2d 
326 (1978); see State v. Crisler, Minn. , 285 30 
N.W.2d 679, 682 (1979); State v. Marcum, 24 Wash. App. 
975, , 601 P.2d 975, 978 (1979). It is not unusual for 
a person in custody, who previously has expressed an 
unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a lawyer, to 
change his mind and 
7 ~ 6i, " :r..., :t,_,, '\-1 
even welcome . an opportunt 'tY ~.to talk. . 35 
~ J}/l "'T. ~-b¼ ~ f)' .(, ~ • 
,. J-'A, , 1 r 'I..~ ';.,(jv"\.d. '-§._'-:1-ll 
As JUSTICE WHITE 
..,. - ..,,,. ~ I/'-- ....... -• I .J,A,,A..J 
as observed, this Court consistently has ~-~ 
t ~ . . . 
"rejected any paternalistic rule protecting a defendant 
from his intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own 
er iminal case." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109 
(1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in result) .1 
1There are, of course, circumstances in which 
a criminal suspect who initially has refused to speak with 




On the basis of the foregoing understanding of 
the Court's decision today, I join its opinion. 
WHITE noted in Michigan v. Mosley: 
Although a recently arrested individual may have 
indicated an initial desire not to answer 
questions, he would nonetheless want to know 
immediately--if it were true--that his ability 
to explain a particular incriminating fact or to 
supply an alibi for a particular time period 
would result in his immediate release. 
Similarly, he might wish to know--if it were 
true--that (1) the case against him was 
unusually strong and that (2) his immediate 
cooperation with the authorities in the 
apprehension and conviction of others or in the 
recovery of property would redound to his 
benefit in the form of a reduced charge. 423 
U.S. 96, 109, n. 1 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring 
in result). 
In Michigan v. Mosley, of course, the question 
was whether a suspect who had invoked his right to remain 
silent' later could change his mind and speak to pol ice. 
The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the present case 
because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is 
nevertheless true in both cases that 
a blanket prohibition against the taking of 
voluntary statements or a permanent immunity 
from further interrogation, regardless of the 
circumstances, would transform the Miranda 
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to 
legitimate police investigative activity, and 
deprive suspects of an opportunity to make 
informed and intelligent assessments of their 
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5 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and write 
separately only to emphasize that a criminal suspect who 
has asked for counsel subsequently may change his mind and 
submit to questioning. 10 
When a suspect requests counsel, interrogation 
of course must cease. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 438, 
474 (1966). If, however, the suspect later demonstrates 
that he has reconsidered and wishes to proceed without 
counsel, cf. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 15 
(1979), subsequent voluntary statements are not 
necessarily obtained in violation of the Constitution. 
The touchstone, as the Court's opinion states, is whether 
the suspect "initiated" the additional interrogation. 
Ante, at 7, 8, 9, n. 9. This petitioner plainly did not; 20 




It is useful to contrast the circumstances of 
this case with typical, and permissible, custodial 
communications between police and a suspect who has asked 
for counsel. For example, pol ice do not impermissibly 25 
"initiate" renewed interrogation by engaging in routine 
conversations with suspects about unrelated matters. And 
police legitimately may inquire whether a suspect has 
changed his mind about speaking to them without an 
attorney. ~, State v. Turner, 32 Or. App. 61, 573 P.2d 30 
326 (1978); see State v. Crisler, Minn. , , 285 
N.W.2d 679, 682 (1979); State v. Marcum, 24 Wash. App. 
975, __ , 601 P.2d 975, 978 (1979). It is not unusual for 
a person in custody, who previously has expressed an 
unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a lawyer, to 35 
change his mind and even welcome an opportunity to talk. 
The Court's opinion today does not erect obstacles that 
preclude police from learning whether a suspect has 
reconsidered his original decision. As JUSTICE WHITE has 
observed, this Court consistently has "rejected any 40 
paternalistic rule protecting a defendant from his 
intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own criminal 
• 
3. 
case." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109 (1975) 
(WHITE, J., concurring in result) . 1 
On the basis of the foregoing understanding of 45 
the Court's decision today, I join its opinion. 
1There are, of course, circumstances in which 
a criminal suspect who initially has refused to speak with 
the police rationally might change his mind. As JUSTICE 
WHITE noted in Michigan v. Mosley: 
Although a recently arrested individual may have 
indicated an initial desire not to answer 
questions, he would nonetheless want to know 
immediately--if it were true--that his ability 
to explain a particular incriminating fact or to 
supply an alibi for a particular time period 
would result in his immediate release. 
Similarly, he might wish to know--if it were 
true--that (1) the case against him was 
unusually strong and that (2) his immediate 
cooperation with the authorities in the 
apprehension and conviction of others or in the 
recovery of property would redound to his 
benefit in the form of a reduced charge. 42 3 
U.S. 96, 109, n. 1 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring 
in result) . 
In Michigan v. Mosley, of course, the question 
was whether a suspect who had invoked his right to remain 
silent later could change his mind and speak to police. 
The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the present case 
because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is 
nevertheless true in both cases that 
a blanket prohibition against the taking of 
voluntary statements or a permanent immunity 
from further interrogation, regardless of the 
circumstances, would transform the Miranda 
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to 
legitimate police investigative activity, and 
deprive suspects of an opportunity to make 
informed and intelligent assessments of their 





No. 79-5269, Edwards v. Arizona 5 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the result. 
Although I agree that the judgment of the 
Arizona Supreme Court should be reversed, 1 I do not join 10 
the Court's opinion because I am not sure what it means. 
I can agree with much of the opinion. It 
states, ante, at 5, the settled rule: 
It is reasonably clear under our cases that 
waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, 
but constitute a knowing and intelligent 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right 
or privilege, a matter which depends in each 
case 'upon the particular facts and 
lAs the Court's decision today demonstrates, 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 438 (1966), continues to have 
the force of binding precedent even though (as JUSTICE 
WHITE made clear in his dissent in Miranda) the additional 
burden imposed on effective law enforcement is neither 
insubstantial nor manifestly required by anything in the 
Constitution. Id., at 526 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Nor 
is Miranda the only safeguard for individuals accused of 
crime. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), 
also confers a right to counsel--one more clearly based on 
the Constitution. Though the Massiah right is independent 
of the Miranda right, they overlap under some 
circumstances. Together they afford a high degree of 
protection to a defendant. 
15 
circumstances surrounding that case, including 
the background, experience and conduct of the 
accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
8 3 6 ( 19 7 5 ) ; Nor th Caro 1 in a v . But 1 e r , 4 41 U • S • 
369, 374-75 (1978); Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare_ v. Michael c., 442 
U • S • 7 0 7 , 7 2 4-7 2 4 ( 19 7 9) :-n:::.·_ 
2. 
I have thought it settled law, as these cases tell us, 
that one accused of er ime may waive any of the 
con st i tut ional safeguards--includ ing the right to remain 
silent, to jury trial, to call witnesses, to cross f xamine 
one's accusers, to testify in one's own behalf, and--of 







for waiver is whether the actor fully understands the 35 
right in question and voluntarily intends to relinquish 
it. 
In its opinion today, however, the Court--after 
reiterating the familiar principles of waiver--goes on to 
say: 
"We further hold that an accused, such as 
Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal 
with the police only through counsel, is not 
subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused has himself 
initiated further communication, exchanges, or 
conversations with the police." Ante, at 7 
(emphasis added). --
In view of the emphasis placed on "initiation," see also 






than I usual-1¥ expect from the pen of Justice White. If -------- -- -
the opinion is read to create a new per se rule, requiring 
IJ 
.. ....,.. 
l l t~ I • J 
a na r:r ow- f-Gcus~ on precisely who opened any conversation ...ert;,. 55 
between an accused and state officials, I 
cannot agree. I would not super impose a new element of 
proof on the established doctrine of waiver of counsel. 
Perhaps the Court's opinion can be read as not 
departing from established doctrine. Accepting the 60 
formulation quoted above, two 
questions are identifiable: ( i) was there in fact 
"interrogation," and (ii) did the police "initiate" it. 
Each of these questions is, of course, relevant to the 
admissibility of a confession. In this case, for example, 65 
it is clear that Edwards was taken from his cell against 
his will and subjected to renewed interrogation. Whether 
.... 
this is ..elu:wwwt:~ iBeo. as police-"initiated" interrogation 
or in some other way, it clearly was questioning under 
circumstances incompatible with a voluntary waiver of the 70 
fundamental right to counsel. 
But few cases will be as clear as this one. 
Communications between police and a suspect in custody are 
4. 
commonplace. ' It is useful to contrast the circumstances of 
I 
this case with typical, and permissible, custodial 75 
communications between police and a suspect who has asked 
for counsel. For example, police do not impermissibly 
"initiate" renewed interrogation by engaging in routine 
conversations with suspects about unrelated matters. And 
police legitimately may inquire whether a suspect has 80 
changed his mind about speaking to them without an 
attorney. E.g., State v. Turner, 32 Or. App. 61, 573 P.2d 
326 (1978); see State v. Crisler, Minn. , 285 
N.W.2d 679, 682 (1979); State v. Marcum, 24 Wash. App. 
975, , 601 P.2d 975, 978 (1979). It is not unusual for 
a person in custody, who previously has expressed an 
unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a lawyer, to 
change his mind and even welcome an opportunity to talk. 
Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that preclude 
~~~-
police from whether a suspect has reconsidered 
his original decision. As JUSTICE WHITE has observed, 
this Court consistently has "rejected any paternalistic 
rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent and 




Michigan v Mosley 423 _.;.___~:::.:__::..:..•_::~~.X., U.S. 96, 109 (1975) (WHITE J , • , 9 5 
concurring in result).2 c~f.,,._.{je,....~J 
~ ~ 'ti ~~ ~ ~ ~ 
In sum, J the 
suspe~¥ sires to talk 
relevant question--whether the 
to police without counsel--is a 
question of fact to be determined in light of all of the 
circumstances. Who "initiated" a conversation may be 
2There are, of course, circumstances in which 
a criminal suspect who initially has refused to speak with 
the police rationally might change his mind. As JUSTICE 
WHITE noted in Michigan v. Mosley: 
"Although a recently arrested individual may 
have indicated an initial desire not to answer 
questions, he would nonetheless want to know 
immediately--if it were true--that his ability 
to explain a particular incriminating fact or to 
supply an alibi for a particular time period 
would result in his immediate release. 
Similarly, he might wish to know--if it were 
true--that (1) the case against him was 
unusually strong and that (2) his immediate 
cooperation with the authorities in the 
apprehension and conviction of others or in the 
recovery of property would redound to his 
benefit in the form of a reduced charge." 423 
U.S. 96, 109, n. 1 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring 
in result). 
In Michigan v. Moslei7, of course, the question 
was whether a suspect who had invoked his right to remain 
silent later could change his mind and speak to pol ice. 
The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the present case 
because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is 
nevertheless true in both cases that 
"a blanket prohibition against the taking of 
voluntary statements or a permanent immunity 
from further interrogation, regardless of the 
circumstances, would transform the Miranda 
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to 
legitimate police investigative activity, and 
deprive suspects of an opportunity to make 
informed and intelligent assessments of their 





relevant to the question of waiver, but it is not the sine 
qua non to the inquiry. The ultimate question is whether 
there was a free and knowing waiver of counsel before 
interrogation commenced. 
If the Court's opinion does nothing more than 105 
restate these principles, -"~-I ~ join it. I agree that 
once counsel has been requested the waiver of that right 
must be clearly established. I hesitate to join the 
opinion only because of what appears to be an undue, and 
undefined, emphasis on a single element: "initiation." 110 
The Court should not "constitutionalize" anything more 
than the traditional requirement that waiver be assessed 




79-5269 EDWARDS v. ARIZONA 
JUSTICE POWELL concurring v<- ti-., ~• 
Although I agree that the judgment of the 
Arizona Supreme Court should be reversed, I do not join 
5 
the Court's opinion because I am not su~ hat it m~an~ ~ 
I can agree with much of what ~ - ) ,l"t 
/j/ 
states near the outset : t-fie ~c ttlc d rtlle . 
"It is reasonably clear under our cases that 
waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, 
but must constitute a knowing and intelligence 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right 
or privilege, a matter which depends in each 
case 'upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case, including 
the background, experience and conduct of the 
accused.'" Johnson v. Zerbst, U.S. , 464 
(19 ); Farretta v. California;-422 u:-S:- 806, 
836-(1975); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 
404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C, 442 U.S. 707, 
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whether it is »e~ . ry in the sense that the actor fully 
~
understands the right in question and /\. intends to 
relinquish it. 
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In its opinion today, i the Court 
-reiterating the familiar principles of 
say: 
"We further hold that an accused, such as 
Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal 
with the police only through counsel, is not 
after 
on to 35 
subject to further interrogation by the '- 40 
authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused has himselL 
initiateq further communication, exchanges or 
conversations with the pol_ice." Ante, at 7, '!Fr(~ 
;~.f!_) 
In view of the emphasis placed on "initiation/\' I 
,~/ qt} I 
find the opinion less clear than I ~ expect from the 
pen of -my Brother and f r iend Just ice White. If the 
opinion is read to create a new per se rule, requiring a - -
narrow focus on precisely who opened any conversation or SOU. 
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1 1) whether in 65 
--Each of tbese is a 
lPgitimate- inqtliry with in the general waiver doctrine. 
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--- Johnson v. Zerbst, and eases cited supra--. In this case, 
for example, it is clear that Edwards was taken from his 
cell against his will A~ t ~ 1~ .. "? renew....,g_ 70 . 
~ characterized interrogation. Whether this 
" ·. T. · -l A 1' ~. t n • r. ~ ,. -6-, _;.._ 
~~-VV'-V'-~-~-{) ~ / 
as 
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No. 79-5269, Edwards v. Arizona 5 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the result. 
Although I agree that the judgment of the 
Arizona Supreme Court should be reversed, 1 I do not join 10 
the Court's opinion because I am not sure what it means. 
I can agree with much of the opinion. It 
states, ante, at 5, the settled ru1:·e: 
I ~1It is reasonably clear under our cases that 
waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, 
qJ5" but constitute a knowing and intelligent 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right 
or privilege, a matter which depends in each 
case 'upon · the ~~rticular facts and 
1As the Court's decision today demonstrates, 
Miranda v. Arizona; 384 U.S. 438 (1966), continues to have 
the force of binding precedent even though (as JUSTICE 
WHITE made clear in his dissent in Miranda) the additional 
burden imposed on effective law enforcement is neither 
insubstantial nor manifestly required by anything in the 
Constitution. Id., at ,526 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Nor 
is Miranda the only safeguard for individuals accused of 
crime. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), 
also confers a right to counsel--one more clearly based on 
the Constitution. Though the Massiah right is independent 
of the Miranda right, they overlap under some 
circumstances. Together they afford a high degree of 
protection to a defendant. 
15 
circumstances surrounding that case, including 
the background, experience and conduct of the 
accused.' Johnson v. zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
836 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 
369, 374-75 (1978); Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 
U.S. 707, 724-724 (1979) ." 
2. 
J(r have thought it settled law, as these cases tell us, 
that one accused of er ime may waive any of the 
constitutional safeguards--including the right to remain 
silent, to jury trial, to call witnesses, to cross-examine 
one's accusers, to testify in one's own behalf, and--of 




for waiver is whether the actor fully understands the 35 
right in question and voluntarily intends to relinquish 
it. 
In its opinion today, however, the Court--after 
reiterating the familiar principles of waiver--goes on to 
say: 
c::P 
' uwe further hold that an accused, such as 
Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal 
with the police only through counsel, is not 
subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused has himself 
initiated further communication, exchanges, or 
conversations with the police." Ante, at 7 
(emphasis added). 
In view of the emphasis placed on "initiation," see also 






than I would expect from the pen of JUSTICE WHITE. If the 
opinion is read to create a new per se rule, requiring a 
threshold inquiry on precisely who opened any conversation 55 
between an accused and state officials, I cannot agree. I 
would not superimpose a new element of proof on the 
established doctrine of waiver of counsel. 
Perhaps the Court's opinion can be read as not 
departing from established doctrine. Accepting the 60 
formulation quoted above, two questions are identifiable: 
( i) was there in fact "interrogation," and (ii) did the 
police "initiate" it. Each of these questions is, of 
course, relevant to the admissibility of a confession. In 
this case, for example, it is clear that Edwards was taken 65 
from his cell against his will and subjected to renewed 
interrogation. Whether this is described as police-
"initiated" interrogation or in some other way, it clearly 
was questioning under circumstances incompatible with a 
voluntary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel. 70 
But few cases will be as clear as this one. 
Communications between police and a suspect in custody are 
commonplace. It is useful to contrast the circumstances 
> 
4. 
of this case with typical, and permissible, custodial 
communications between police and a suspect who has asked 75 
for counsel. For example, pol ice do not impermiss ibly 
"initiate" renewed interrogation by engaging in routine 
conversations with suspects about unrelated matters. And 
police legitimately may inquire whether a suspect has 
changed his mind about speaking to them without an 80 
attorney. ~, State v. Turner, 32 Or~ App. 61, 573 P.2d 
326 (1978); see State v. Crisler, Minn. , 285 
N.W.2d 679, 682 (1979); State v. Marcum, 24 Wash. App. 
975, , 601 P.2d 975, 978 (1979). It is not unusual for 
a person in custody, who previously has expressed an 85 
unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a lawyer, to 
change his mind and even welcome an opportunity to talk. 
Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that preclude 
police from ascertaining whether a suspect has 
reconsidered his original decision. As JUSTICE WHITE has 90 
observed, this Court consistently has "rejected any 
paternalistic rule protecting a defendant from his 
intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own criminal 
case." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109 (1975) 
.. 
5. 
(WHITE, J., concurring in result) • 2 
In sum, once warnings have been given and the 
right to counsel has been invoked, the relevant question--
whether the suspect now desires to talk to police without 
counsel--is a question of fact to be determined in light 
of all of the circumstances. Who "initiated" a 
2There are, of course, circumstances in which 
a criminal suspect who initially has refused to speak with 
the police rationally might change his mind. As JUSTICE 
WHITE noted in Michigan v. Mosley: 
/ "Although a recently arrested individual may 
have indicated an initial desire not to answer 
questions, he would nonetheless want to know 
immediately--if it were true--that his ability 
to explain a particular incriminating fact or to 
supply an alibi for a particular time period 
would result in his immediate release. 
Similarly, he might wish to know--if it were 
true--that (1) the case against him was 
unusually strong and that (2) his immediate 
cooperation with the authorities in the 
apprehension and conviction of others or in the 
recovery of property would redound to his 
benefit in the form of a reduced charge." 423 
U.S. 96, 109, n. 1 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring 
in result). 
In Michigan v. Mosley, of course, the question 
was whether a suspect who had invoked his right to remain 
silent later could change his mind and speak to police. 
The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the present case 
because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is 
nevertheless true in both cases that 
/ "a blanket prohibition against the taking of 
voluntary statements or a permanent immunity 
from further interrogation, regardless of the 
circumstances, would transform the Miranda 
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to 
legitimate police investigative activity, and 
deprive suspects of an opportunity to make 
informed and intelligent assessments of their 






conversation may be relevant to the question of waiver, 
but it is not the sine qua non to the inquiry. The 
ultimate question is whether there was a free and knowing 
waiver of counsel before interrogation commenced. 
If the Court's opinion does nothing more than 105 
restate these principles, I could join it. I agree that 
once counsel has been requested the waiver of that right 
must be clearly established. I hesitate to join the 
opinion only because of what appears to be an undue, and 
undefined, emphasis on a single element: "initiation." 110 
The Court should not "constitutionalize" anything more 
than the traditional requirement that waiver be assessed 
under the Zerbst standard. 
lfp/ss 4/14/81 Rider A, p. 2 (Edwards) 
ED2 
SALLY-POW 
Add a footnote as follows: 
2. The fact that there was interrogation in this 
case is ' not questioned. It may be a critical question in 
either a Miranda case, e.g., Innis v. Rhode Island, U.S. 
(1980), or a Massiah case, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 
U.S. (1976). 
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settled~ ....-: Yet, as Justice White made clear in his 
dissent in Miranda, th~ ule announced in that case is not 
o,rf-..f tlp ~ 
manifestly required by anything in the lConstitution. l Id., 
F!:!/ 
at 527 (White, J., dissenting). Nor is the resulting burden -
on law enforcement insubstantial, as evidenced by the number 
of cases generated by it at every Term of this Cour1/" The -
~ ~.e.Ae"2--~ i,zc; ~ 
( present case E-eEJtti£Qlii tRe applie.tion of eo ~ Miranda ..ad- / 
"\ ~~tt~cc',-f ~ ~ ~ ~
Massiah. The general rule enunciated in Massiah, however, 
fr.J is grounded in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right 
that may be invoked whether or not a person formally 
is in custody. Williams v. Brewer, n. 
(1976). 
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the result. 
Although I agree that the judgment of the Arizona . Su-
preme Court be reversed,1 I do not join the Court's opinion 
because I am not sure what it means. 
I can agree with much of the opinion. It states, ante, at 
5, the settled rule: 
"It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of 
counsel must not only be voluntary, but constitute a 
knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in 
each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case, including the background, experi-
ence and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938); Faretta v. California, 422 
U. S. 806, 836 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 
U. S. 369, 374-375 (1978); Brewer v. Williams, 430 
the Court's decision today demonstrates, Miranda v. A rizona, 
S. 438 ( 1966), continues to have the force of binding precedent even 
though (as Jus'l'ICE WHITE made clear in his dissent in Miranda) the 
additional burden imposed on effective law enforcement is neither insub- -+---
stantial nor manifestly required by anything in the Constitution. Id. , at 
526 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Nor is Miranda the only safeguard for 
individuals accused of crime. Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 
(1964), also confers a right to counsel-one more clearly based on the 
Constitution. Though the Massiah right is independent of the Miranda 
right, they overlap under some circumstances. Together they afford a · 
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U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 
724--724 (1979)." 
I have thought it settled law, as these cases tell us, that one 
accused of crime may waive any of the constitutional safe-
guards-including the right to remain silent, to jury trial, to 
call witnesses, to cross-examine one's accusers, to testify in 
one's own behalf, and-of course-to have counsel. What-
ever the right, the standard for waiver is whether the actor 
fully understands the right in question and voluntarily in-
tends to relinquish it. 
In its opinion today, however, the Court-after reiterating 
the familiar principles of waiver-goes on to say: 
"We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, hav-
ing expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation 
by the authorities until counsel has been made available· 
to him, unless the accused has himself init-iated further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
police." Ante, at 7 (emphasis added). 
In view of the emphasis placed on "initiation,'' see also id., ~ ~ 
at 8, 9, n. 9, I find the Court's opinion~ elea~ th.an I ,~ ____ · 
e,,:r,eet from the- ,,en of -Jt1CTICi1 WIII'PE. If L-
read to create a new per se rule, requiring a threshold inquiry >--
precisely who opened any conversation between an ac-
cused and state officials, I cannot agree. I would not super-
impose a new element of proof on the established doctrine of 
waiver of counsel. 
Perhaps the Court's opinion can be read as not departing 
from established doctrine. Accepting the formulation quoted 
above, two questions are identifiable: (i) was there in fact 
"interrogation," and (ii) did the police "initiate" it. Each 
of these questions is, of course, relevant to the admissibility 
of a confession. In this case, for example, it is clear that 
Edwards was taken from his cell against his will and sub-
jected to renewed interrogation. Whether this is described 
. :t 
~Kl,.Lt 
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as police-"initiated" interrogation or in some other way, it 
clearly was questioning under circumstances iHeomparal,le 
with a voluntary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel. 
But few cases will be as clear as this one. Communica-
tions between police and a suspect in custody are common-
place. It is useful to contrast the circumstances of this case 
with typical, and permissible, custodial communications be-
tween police and a suspect who has asked for counsel. For 
example. police do not impermissibly "initiate" renewed in-
terrogation by engaging in routine conversations with sus-
pects about unrelated matters. And nolice legitimately may 
inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind about speak-
ing to them without an attorney. E. g., State v. Turner, 
32 Ore. App. 61 , 573 P. 2d 326 (1978); see State v. Crisler, 
- Minn. -. - , 285 N. W. 2d 679. 6fl2 (1979): State v. 
Marcum. 21: Wash. App. 975. - , 601 P. 2d 975, 978 (1979). 
It is not unusual for a person in cw:.tody who previously has 
Pxpressed 911 unwiJlingnef'P. to talk or a desire to have a 
lawyer. to rhange his mind :rnd even welcome an opportunity 
to t::ilk. Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that 
pre.chide nolice from af'.rertaining whether a f'nsnect has re-
consrderPd his original ctecif'1on!\ As JUSTICE WHITE has ob-
served. this Court consistently has "re.iected 9ny paternalistic 
rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent ::ind volun-
t::irv decisions ahout his own criminRl case." Michiaan v. 
Mo11fo11. 423 U. S. 96, 109 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in 
result)(:;l 
!though a recently arrested individuRl mav have hdicated an initial 
desire not to answer questions. he wn11ld noneth ~less want to kr>ow imme-
diately-if it were true-that his ability to exnlain a parfrulnr inrrimi-
natiT'g fart or to Rupplv an al\bi for a partirulitr time neriod would r P-
sult in his immediate release. 8imilarlv, he might wish to know-if it 
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In sum, once warnings have been :i~~ d the right to 
counsel has been invoked, the relevan~
1
~-whether the 
suspect now desires to talk to police without counsel-is a 
question of fact to be determined in light of all of the cir-
cumstances. Who "initiated" a conversation may be rele-
vant to the question of waiver, but it is not the sine qua non 
to the inquiry. The ultimate question is whether there was 
2, free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation 
commenced. 
If the Court's opinion does nothing more than restate these 
principles, I could join it. I agree that once counsel has been 
requested the waiver of that right must be clearly estab-
lished. I hesitate to join the opinion only because of what 
appears to be an undue, and undefined , emphasis on a single 
element: "initiation." The Court should not "constitution-
alize" anything more than the traditional requirement that 
waiver be assessed under the Zerbst standard. 
(2) his immediate cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension 
and conviction of others or in the recovery of property would redound to 
his benefit in the form of a reduced charge." 423 U. S. 96, 109, n. 1 
(1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in result ). 
In M ichigan v. Mosley, of course, the qnestion was whether a suspect 
who had invoked his right to remain silent later could change his mind and 
speak to police. The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the present 
case because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is nevertheless 
true in both cases that 
"a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a 
permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the cir-
cumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational 
obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects 
of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their 





If the Court's opinion does nothin ore than 
restate these principles, I am in agreement ith it. I 
hesitate to join the opinion only because f what appears to 
be an undue, and undefined, emphasis on a ingle element: 
"initiation." As JUSTICE WHITE has noted, Miranda v. 
Arizona in effect "constitutionalized" a prophylactic rule 
that is not manifestly required by anything in the text of 
the Constitution. 384 U.S. at 526 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
2/ Miranda itself recognized, however, that counsel's 
assistance can be waived. Id., at --- (opinion of Warren, 
C.J.). Suet,: 't/aiver always has been evaluated under the 
Zerbst standard quoted above. The Court should not--and, I 
hope, does not today--stray from precedent by 
"constitutionalizing" the concept of "initiation" into the 
waiver inquiry.]/ 
2/ The Court decides the present case on Miranda 
grounds without reaching the argument that ia ■ namu Rf 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), also was 
violated. The rule of Massiah, l _ g is textually fi ::l; 
grounded in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right 
that may be invoked by any person who has been formally 
charged, whether or not he is in custody. See Brewer v. 
Williams, --- U.S.---, ---/\n. --- (1977). 
J 
11 Such a step would need to be taken only if it is 
clear that the traditional Zerbst standard somehow is 
ineffective. There is no indication, in the multitude of 
cases that come to us each Term, that Zerbst and its progeny 
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JUSTICE PoWELL, concurring in the result. 
Although I agree that the judgment of the Arizona Su-
preme Court be reversed/ I do not join the Court's opinion 
because I am not sure what it means. 
I can agree with much of the opinion. It states, ante, at 
5, the settled rule: 
"It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of 
counsel must not only be voluntary, but constitute a 
knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in 
each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case, including the background, experi-
ence and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938); Faretta v. California, 422 
U. S. 806, 836 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 
U. S. 369, 374-375 (1978); Brewer v. Williams, 430 
1 As the Court's decision today demonstrates, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U. S. 438 (1966), continues to have the force of binding precedent even 
though (as JUSTICE WHITE made clear in his dissent in Miranda) the 
additional burden imposed on effective law enforcement is neither insub-
stantial nor manifestly required by anything in the Constitution. Id., at 
526 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Nor is Miranda the only safeguard for 
individuals accused of crime. Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 
(1964), also confers a right to counsel- one more clearly based on the 
Constitution. Though the Massiah right is independent of the Miranda 
right, they overlap under some circumstances. Together they afford a , 
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U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442lJ. S. 707, 
724--724 (1979)." 
I have thought it settled law, as these cases tell us, that one 
accused of crime may waive· any of the constitutional safe-
guards-including the right to remain silent, to jury trial, to 
call witnesses, to cross-examine one's accusers, to testify in 
one's own behalf, and-of course-to have counsel. What-
ever the right, the standard for waiver is whether the actor 
fully understands the right in question and voluntarily in-
tends to relinquish it. 
In its opinion today, however, the Court-after reiterating 
the familiar principles of waiver-goes on to say: 
"We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, hav-
ing expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
through counsel, is not subject to further :interrogation 
by the authorities until counsel has been made available 
to him, unless the ' accused has himself init-iated further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
police." Ante, at 7 (emphasis added). 
In view of the emphasis placed on "initiation," see also id., 
at 8, 9, n. 9, I find the Court's opinion less clear than I would 
expect from the pen of JUSTICE WHITE. Tf the opinion is 
read to create a new per se rule, requiring a threshold :inquiry 
on precisely who opened any conversation between an ac-
cused and state officials, I cannot agree. I would not super-
impose a new element of proof on the established doctrine of 
waiver of counsel. 
Perhaps the Court's opinion can be read as not departing 
from established doctrine. Accepting the formulation quoted 
above, two questions are identifiable: (i) was there in fact 
":interrogation," and (ii) did the police "initiate" it. Each 
of these questions is, of course, relevant to the admissibility 
of a confession. In this case, for example, it is clear that 
Edwa.rds was taken from his cell against his will and sub-
jected to renewed interrogation. Whether this is described 
_,, A 
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as police-"initiated" interrogation or in some other way, it 
clearly was questioning under circumstances incomparable 
with a voluntary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel. 
But few cases will be as clear as this one. Communica-
tions between police and a suspect in custody are common-
place. It is useful to contrast the circumstances of this case 
with typical, and permissible, custodial communications be-
tween police and a suspect who has asked for counsel. For 
example. police do not impermissibly "initiate" renewed in-
terrogation by engaging in routine conversations with sus-
pects about unrelated matters. And police legitimately may 
inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind about speak-
ing to them without an attorney. E. g. , State v. Turner, 
32 Ore. App. 61 , 573 P. 2d 326 (1978); see State v. Crisler, 
- Minn. - . - , 285 N. W. 2d 679. 682 (1979): State v. 
Marcum. 21 Wash. App. 975. - , 601 P. 2d 975, 978 (1979). 
It is not unusual for a person in custody who previously has 
f'xpre~sed an unwiJlingness to talk or a desire to have a 
lawyer. to change his mind find even welcome an opportunity 
to tfllk. Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that 
preclude Dolice from af'.<>ertaining whether a f'-llspect has re-
considerPd his original decif'-ion. As JusTICE WHITE has ob-
served. this Court consistently has "rejected any paternalistic 
rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent find volun-
farv decisionR ahout. his own criminal case." Michirran v. 
Mo,~leu. 423 U. S. 96, 109 (1975) (WHITE, J. , concurring in 
result). 2 
2 There are, of rourse, rir~um~tanres in whirh a rriminal susnert who 
init ially has refu sed to speak with the police rationally might chaPge his 
mind. As JUSTICE WHITE noted in Michigan v. Mosley: 
"Although a recently arrested individual mav have indicated an initial 
desire not to answer qu estions. he would nonethrless want to know imme-
diately-if it were true-that his ability to exnlain a partinular inrrimi-
nating fa rt or to supply an alibi for a parti rufar time neriod would rf' -
sult in his immediate release. Similarly, he might wish to know-if it 
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In sum, once warnings have been given and the right to 
counsel has been invoked, the relevant question-whether the 
suspect now desires to talk to police without counsel-is a 
question of fact to be determined in light of all of the cir-
cumstances. Who "initiated" a conversation may be rele-
vant to the question of waiver, but it is not the sine qua non 
to the inquiry. The ultimate question is whether there was 
r, free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation 
commenced. 
If the Court's opinion does nothing more than restate these 
principles, I could join it. I agree that once counsel has been 
requested the waiver of that right must be clearly estab-
lished. I hesitate to join the opinion only because of what 
appears to be an undue, and undefin~d, emphasis on a single 
element: "initiation." The Court should not "constitution-
alize" anything more than the traditional requirement that 
waiver be assessed under the Zerbst standard. 
(2) his immediate cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension 
and conviction of others or in the recovery of property would redound to 
his benefit in the form of a reduced charge." 423 U. S. 96, 109, n. 1 
(1975) (WHrrE, J., concurring in result). 
In Michigan v. Mosley, of course, the question was whether a suspect 
who had invoked his right to remain silent later could change his mind and 
speak to police. The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the present 
case because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is nevertheless 
true in both cases that 
"a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a 
permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the cir-
cumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational 
obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects 
of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their 
interests." Id., at 102-103 (opinion of STEWART, J.) . 
t 
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JusTICE PoWELL, concurring in the result. 
Although I agree that the judgment of the Arizona Su-
preme Court must be reversed, I do not join the Court's opin-
ion because I am not sure what it means. 
I can agree with much of the opinion. It states the settled 
rule: 
"It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of 
counsel must not only be voluntary, but constitute a 
knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in 
each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case, including the background, experi-
ence and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938); Faretta v. Californ-ia, 422 
U. S. 806, 836 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 
U. S. 369, 374-375 (1978); Brewer v. Will-iams, 430 
U. S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 
724-724 (1979)." Ante, at 5. 
I have thought it settled law, as these cases tell us, that one 
accused of crime may waive any of the constitutional safe-
guards-including the right to remain silent, to jury trial, to 
call witnesses, to cross-examine one's accusers, to testify in 
one's own behalf, and-of course-to have counsel. What-
ever the right, the standard for waiver is whether the actor 
fully understands the right in question and voluntarily in-
tends to relinquish it .. 
.. . , 
2 
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In its opinion today, however, the Court-after reiterating 
the familiar principles of waiver-goes on to say: 
"We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, hav-
ing expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation 
by the authorities until counsel has been made available 
to him, unless the accused has himself initi,ated further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
poli(;e." Ante, at 7 (emphasis added). 
In view of the emphasis placed on "initiation," see also id., 
at 8, 9, n. 9, I find the Court's opinion unclear. If read to 
create a new per se rule, requiring a threshold inquiry as to 
precisely who opened any conversation between an accused 
and state officials, I cannot agree. I would not superimpose 
a new el~ment of proof on the established doctrine of waiver 
of counsel. 
Perhaps the Court's opinion can be read as not departing 
from established doctrine. Accepting the formulation quoted 
above, two questions are identifiable: (i) was there in fact 
"interrogation," see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 
(1980), and (ii) did the police "initiate" it. Each of these 
questions is, of course, relevant to the admissibility of a con-
fession. In this case, for example, it is clear that Edwards 
was taken from his cell against his will and subjected to re-
newed interrogation. Whether this is described as police-
"initiateq." interrogation or in some other way, it clearly was 
questioning under circumstances incompatible with a volun-
tary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel. 
But few cases will be as clear as this one. Communica-
tions between police and a suspect in custody are common-
place. It is useful to contrast the circumstances of this case 
with typical, and permissible, custodial communications be-
tween police and a suspect who has asked for counsel. For 
example, police do not impermissibly "initiate" renewed in-
terrogation by engaging in routine conversations with sus-
11 • ) 
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pects about unrelated matters. And police legitimately may 
inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind about speak-
ing to them without an attorney. E. g., State v. Turner, 
32 Ore. App. 61 , 573 P. 2d 326 (1978); see State v. Crisler, 
- Minn.-,-, 285 N. W. 2d 679, 682 (1979); State v. 
Marcum, 24 Wash. App. 975, -, 601 P. 2d 975, 978 (1979). 
It is not unusual for a person in custody who previously has 
expressed an unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a 
lawyer, to change his mind and even welcome an opportunity 
to talk. Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that 
preclude police from ascertaining whether a suspect has re-
considered his original decision. As JusTICE WHITE has ob-
served, this Court consistently has "rejected any paternalistic 
rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent and volun-
tary decisions about his own criminal case." Michigan v. 
Mosley, 423 U. S. 96, 109 (1975) (WHITE, J. , concurring in 
result).1 
1 JusTICE WHITE noted in Michigan v. Mosley: 
"Although a recently arrested individual may have indicated an initial 
desire not to answer questions, he would nonetheless want to know imme-
diately-if it were true-that his ability to explain a particular incrimi-
nating fact _or to supply an alibi for a particular time period would re-
sult in his immediate releaoe. Similarly, he might wi::;h to know-if it 
were true-that (1) the case against him was unusually strong and that 
(2) his immediate cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension 
and conviction of others or in the recovery of property would redound to 
his benefit in the form of a reduced charge." 423 U. S. 96, 109, n. I 
(1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in result). 
In Michigan v. Mosley, of course, the question was whether a suspect 
who had invoked his right to remain silent later could change his mind arid 
speak to police. The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the pre::;ent 
case because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is nevertheless 
true in both ca::;es that 
"a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a 
permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the cir-
cumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational 
' obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects 
,. , ,. 
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In sum, once warnings have been given and the right to 
counsel has been invoked, the relevant inquiry-whether the 
suspect now desires to talk to police without counsel-is a 
question of fact to be determined in light of all of the cir-
cumstances. Who "initiated" a conversation may be rele-
vant to the question of waiver, but it is not the sine qua non 
to the inquiry. The ultimate question is whether there was 
a free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation 
commenced. 
If the Court's opinion does nothing more than restate these 
principles, I am in agreement with it. I hesitate to join 
the opinion only because of what appears to be an undue, 
and undefined, emphasis on a single element: "initiation." 
As JusTICE WHITE has noted, the Court in Miranda v. Ari-
zona in effect "constitutionalized" a general prophylactic rule 
that is not manifestly required by anything in the text of 
the Constitution. 384 U. S., at 526 (WHITE, J. , dissenting) . 
Miranda itself recognized, however, that coum'.el's assistance 
can be waived. Id., at 475 (opinion of Warren, C. J.) . 
Waiver always has been evaluated under the general formu-
lation a.t the Zerbst standard quoted above. My concern is 
that the Court's opinion today may be read as "constitution-
alizing" not the generalized Zerbst standard but a single ele-
ment of fact among the various facts that may be relevant 
to determining whether there has been a valid waiver.2 
of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their 
interests." Id., at 102-103 (opinion of STEWART, J.) . 
2 Such a step should be taken only if it is demonstrably clear that the 
t radition waiver standard is ineffective. There is no indication, in the 
multitude of cases that come to us each Term, that Zerbst and its progeny 
have fai led to protect constitut.ional rights. 
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JUSTICE POWELL,F uning in tne result. 
Although I agree that the judgment of the Arizona Su-
preme Court must be reversed, I do not join the Court's opin-
ion because I am not sure what it means. 
I can agree with much of the opinion. It states the settled 
rule : 
"It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of 
counsel must not only be voluntary, but constitute a 
knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in 
each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case, including the background, experi-
ence and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938); Faretta v. Californ-ia, 422 
U. S. 806, 836 (1975); N orth · Carolina v. Butler, 441 
U. S. 369, 374-375 (1978) ; Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U. S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 
724-724 (1979)." Ante, at 5. 
I have thought it settled law, as these cases tell us, that one 
accused of crime may waive any of the constitutional safe-
guards-including the right to remain silent, to jury trial, to 
call witnesses, to cross-examine one's accusers, to testify in 
one's own behalf, and-of course- to have counsel. What-
. ever the right, the standard for waiver is whether the actor 
fully understands the right i11 question and voluntarily in-
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In its opinion today, however, the Court-after reiterating 
the familiar principles of waiver-goes on to say: 
"We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, hav-
ing expressed his desire to deal wi'th the police only 
tp.rough counsel, is not subject to further interrogation 
by the authorities until counsel has been made available 
to him, unless the accused has him~elf initiated further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
poli(:e." Ante, at 7 (emphasis added). 
In view of the emphasis placed on "initiation," see also id., 
at 8, 9, n. 9, I find the Court's opinion unclear. If read to 
create a new per se rule, requiring a threshold inquiry as to 
precisely who opened any conversation between an accused 
and state officials, I cannot agree. I would not superimpose 
a new elrment of proof on the established doctrine of waiver 
of co4nsel. 
Perp.aps the Court's opinion can be read as not departing 
from established doctrine. Accepting the formulation quoted 
above, t1\'0 questions are identifiable: (i) was there in fact 
"interro~ation," see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 
(1980), ~nd (ii) did the police "initiate" it. Each of these 
question~ is, of course, relevant to the admissibility of a con-
fession. In this case, for example, it is clear that Edwards 
was takep from his cell against his will and subjected to re-
neweq i11terrogation. Whether this is described as police-
'finitiateq." interrogation or in some other way, it clearly was 
questioning under circumstances incompatible with a volun-
tary wa.iyer of the fundamental right to counsel. 
But few cases will be as clear as this one. Communica-
tions between police and a suspect in custody are common-
place. It is useful to contrast the circumstances of this case 
with typical, and permissible, custodial communications be-
tween police and a suspect who has asked for counsel. For 
example, police do not impermissibly "initiate" renewed in-
terrogatiqn by engaging in routine conversations with sus-
(ps 
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pects about unrelated matters. And police legitimately may 
inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind about speak-
ng to them without an attorney. E . g., State v. Turner, 
32 Ote..:.-App. 61J.573 P. 2d 326,(C"l978); see Sfate v. Crisle;, 
~ Minn. , ::::)285 N. W. 2d 679, 682 <f979); St~ v. 
M_arcum, 24 \V.ash.~-. 601 P. 2d 975, 978 (1979). 
It is not unusual for a person in custody who previously has 
expressed an unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a 
lawyer, to change his mind and even welcome an opportunity 
to talk. Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that 
preclude police from ascertaining whether a suspect has re-
considered his original decision. As JusTICE WHITE has ob-
served, this Court consistently has "rejected any paternalistic 
rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent and volun-
tary decisions about his own criminal case." Michigan v. 
Mosley, 423 U. S. 96, 109 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in 
result).1 
1 JusTICE WHITE noted in Michigan v. Mosley: 
"Although a recently arrested individual may have indicated an initial 
desire not to answer questions, he would nonetheless want to know imme-
• diately-if it were true-that his ability to explain a particular incrimi-
nating fact or to supply an alibi for a pa1iicular time period would re-
sult in hil:l immediate release. Similarly, he might wish to know-if it 
were true-that (1) the ca.,,e against him was unusually strong and that 
(2) his immediate cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension 
and conviction of others or in the recovery of property would redound to 
his benefit in the form of a reduced charge." 423 U. S. 96, 109, n. I 
(1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in result). 
In Michigan v. Mosley, of cour,;e, the question was whether a suspect 
who had invoked his right to remain silent later could change his mind and 
speak to police. The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the pre,;ent 
case because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is nevertheless 
true in both ca,;e::; that 
"a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statementl:l or a 
permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the cir-
cumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational 
' obstacles to legitimate police invel:ltigative activity, and deprive suspects 
-@ 
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In sum, once warnings have been given and the right to 
counsel has been invoked, the relevant inquiry-whether the 
suspect now desires to talk to police without counsel-is a 
question of fact to be determined in light of all of the cir-
cumstances. Who "initiated" a conversation may be rele-
vant to the question of waiver, but it is not the sine qua non 
to the inquiry. The ultimate question is whether there was 
a free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation 
commenced. 
If the Court's opinion does nothing more than restate these 
principles, I am in agreement with it. I hesitate to join 
the opinion only because of what appears to be an undue, 
and undefined, emphasis on a single element: "initiation." 
As JUSTICE WHITE has noted, the Court in Miranda v. Ari-
-=.zonaG_n effect "constitutionalized;) a general prophylac · · 
that is not manifestly required by anythin · e text of • se.e. 
the Constitution. 384 U. S. , at 526 ITE, J. , dissenting)~~ " 
Jg ~ U.S . .> 
Miranda itself reci· nized, howeve , that counEel's assistance (IA, ~'<J°'-~ i.t;, 
can be waived:- Id., at 475 (opinion of Warren, C. J.). ~~l?.~ i.f'4:S-4~ ~ 
Waiver always has een evaluated under the general formu- \J .? :) ' 
~ 
I lation at the Zerbst standard quoted above. My concern is ( l<t
1 'l • 
that the Court's opinion today may be read as "constitution-
alizing" not the generalized Zerbst standard but a single ele-
ment of fact among the various facts that may be relevant 
to determining whether there has been a valid waiver.2 
of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their 
interests." Id., at 102-103 (opinion of STEWART, J.) . 
2 Such a swp should be taken only if it is demonst rably clear that the 
~waiver standard is ineffective. There is no indication, in the 
multitude of cases that come to us each Term, that Zerbst and its progeny 
have fai led to protect constitutional rights. 
• 
~ i P•i jo: The Chief Justice Mr. Juat ice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Juatic~ ifll1t e 
4-27-81 
Mt-. Justice ;hr shall 
Mr. Justice Blac~mun 
, Mr. Justice R<>hnq ui st 
2n<J DRAff Mr. Justice Stevens 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED,~ . Justice Powell 
No. 79..-5269 c1·rculated: ____ _ 
Recircu]<lt<>~ · 
Robert Edwards, Petitioner, I On Writ of Certiorari to the-
v. Supreme Court of Arizona. 
State of Arizona, 
' 
[April -.,' 1981] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, 
concurring in the result . . 
Although I agree that the judgment of the Arizona Su~ 
preme Court must be reversed, I do not join the Court'_s opin• 
ion because I am not sure what it means. 
I can agree with much of the opinion. It states the settled 
rule: 
"It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of 
counsel must not only be voluntary, but constitute a 
knowipg and intelligent relinquishment or abandonmeµt 
of µ, known right or privilege, a matter which depends in 
each ~ase 'upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that ~ase, including the background, exper,i• 
enoe and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerb~t, 
304 U. S. 458, 464 (1936); Faretta v. California, 422 
U. S: 806, 836 (1'975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 
U. S. 369, 374-375 (1978); Brewer v. Williq,ms, 430 
/ 
U. S. S87, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 
724-724 0979).'' Ante, at 5. 
l have thought it settled law, as these cases tell us, that one 
'accused bf crime may waive any of the constitution.al safe• 
guards-including the right to remain silent, to jury trial, to 
call witnesses, to cross-,examine one's accusers, to testify in 
•One's own behalf, and-:-of course-to have counsel. What• 
ever the right, the standard for waiver is whether the actor 
fully upderstancls- th,e rigqt in question and voluntarily in, .... 
tends to r~lir1qui~h it. 
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In its opinion today, however, the Court-after reiterating 
the familiar principles of waiver-goes on to say: 
"We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, hav-
ing expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
th,ougfu counsel, is not subject to further interrogation 
by the authorities until counsel has been made available 
to him, unless the accused has himself initiated furt'!,er 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
f>Olice." Ante, at 7 (emphasis added). 
In view of the emphasis placed on ''initiation," see also id., 
at 8, 9, n. 9, I find the Court's opinion unclear. If read to 
treate a new per se rule, requiring a threshold inquiry as to 
precisely who opened any conversation between an accused 
and state officials, I cannot agree. I would not superimpose 
a new element of proof on the established doctrine of waiver 
of counsel. 
Perhaps the Court's opinion can be read as not depatting 
from established doctrine. Accepting the formulation quoted 
above, two questions are identifiable: (i) was there in fact 
''interrogation," see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 
(1980) , and (ii) did the police ''initiate" it. Each of these 
questions is, of course, relevant to the admissibility of a con-
fession. In this case, for example, it is clear that Edwards 
was taken from his cell against his will and subjected to re-
newed interrogation. Whether this is described as police-
"initiated" interrogation or in some other way, it clearly was 
questioning under circumstances incompatible with a volun-
tary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel. 
But few cases will be as clear as this one. Communica-
tions between police and a suspect in custody are common-
place. It is useful to contrast the circumstances of this case 
with typical, and permissible, custodial communications be-
tween police and · a suspect who has asked for counsel. For 
example, police do not impermissibly "initiate" · renewed in-
terrogation by engaging in routine conversations with au$•· 
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pects about unrelated matters. And police legitimately may 
inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind i;i,bout speak-
ing to them without an attorney. E. g., State v. Turner, 
32 Ore. App. 61, 65, 573 P. 2d 326, 327 (1978); see State v. 
Crisler, 285 N. W. 2d 679, 682 (Minn. 1979); State v. Mqr-
cum, 24 Wash. App. 441, -, 601 P. 2d 975, 978 (1979). 
It is not unusual for a person in custody who previously has 
expressed an unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a 
lawyer, to change his mind and even welcome an opportunity 
to talk. Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that 
preclude police from ascertaining ,whether a· suspect qas re-
considered his original decision. As JUSTICE WHITE has ob-
served, this Court consistently has "rejected any paternalistic 
rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent and · volun-
tary decisions about his Qwn criminal case." Michigan v. 
Mosley, 423 U. S. 96, 109 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring~in 
result).1 
1 JusTICE WHITE noted in Michigan v. Mosley: 
"Although a recently arrested individual may have· indicated an- initial 
desire not to answer questions, he would nonetheless want -to know imme-
diately-if it were true-that his ability to explain a particular incr-imi-
pa ting fact or to supply an alibi for a particular time period would re-
~ult in his immediate release. Similarly, be might · wish to know-if it 
were true-that (1) the_ case against him was unusually strong and that 
(2) bis immediate cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension 
and conviction of others or in the recovery of ·property would redound to 
his benefit in the form of a reduced charge." 423· U. S. 96, 109, n. 1 
(1975) (WHITE, J ., concurring in result) . 
In Michigan v. Mosley, of course, the question was ·wbether a suspect 
who had invoked his right to remain silent later could change his mind and 
speak to police. The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the present 
case because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is ·nevertheless 
true in both cases that 
"a blanket prohibition against the ·taking of voluntary statements or a 
permanent immunity from further interrogation, -regardless of- the - cir-
cumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into-wholly irrational 
"obstacles to legitimate police · investigative activity, anq ?~prive . s~specU;; 
J 
/ 
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In sum, once warnings have been given and the right to 
counsel has been invoked, the relevant inquiry-whether the 
suspect now desires to talk to police without counsel-is a 
question of fact to be determined in light of all of the cir-
cumstances. Who "initiated" a conversation may be rele ... 
vant to the question of waiver, but it is not the sine qua non 
to the inquiry. The ultimate question is whether there was 
a free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation 
commenced. 
If the Court's opinion does nothing more than restate these 
principles, I am in agreement with it. I hesitate to join 
the opinion only because of what appears to be an undue, 
and undefined, emphasis on a single element: "initiation." 
As JusTICE WHITE has noted, the Court in Miranda v. Ari-
zona imposed a general prophylactic rule that is not mani-
festly required by anything in the text of the Constitution. 
384 U. S. , at 526 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 443-444 (1974). Miranda itself rec-
ognized, moreover, that counsel's assistance can be waived. 
384 U. S., at 475 (opinion of Warren, C. J.). Waiver always 
has been evaluated under the general formulation @1lie 
Zerbst standa.rd quoted above. My concern is that the 
Court's opinion today may be read as "constitutionalizing" 
not the generalized Zerbst standard but a single element of 
fact among the various facts that may be relevant to deter-
mining whether there has been a valid waiver.2 
of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their• 
interests." Id., at 102-103 (opinion of STEWART, J.). 
2 Such a swp should be taken only if it is demonstrably clear that the 
traditional wa.iver standard is ineffective. There is no indication, in the 
multitude of cases that come to us each Term, that Zerbs·t and its progeny 









THE CH I EF JUSTICE 
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April 28, 1981 
RE : No. 79-5269, Edward s v. Arizona 
Dear By r on: 
I cannot agree that the ho l ding of Miranda--
or its dicta--compels anyt h i ng more than our 
traditional standard of a voluntary renouncement 
of a known right or privile ge. Who starts the 
resumed conversation is not constitutionally 
dispositive for me, and I would not want to get 
into a "special rule" for this. 
I shall be writing a brief concurrence, but 
it will not be ready in time for the case to come 
down this week . 
Rega r ds, 
~8-
Justice White 
Copies t o the Conference 
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